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Abstract
Electoral control models ways of changing the outcome of an election via such actions
as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters. These actions modify an election’s
participation structure and aim at either making a favorite candidate win (“constructive control”)
or preventing a despised candidate from winning (“destructive control”). To protect elections
from such control attempts, computational complexity has been investigated with an eye to
showing that electoral control, though not impossible, is at least not always computationally
easy, unless P equals NP. Such hardness results are termed resistance, and it has been a long-
running project of research in this area to classify the major voting systems in terms of their
resistance properties.
We show that fallback voting, an election system proposed by Brams and Sanver [BS09]
to combine Bucklin with approval voting, is resistant to each of the common types of control
except to destructive control by either adding or deleting voters. Thus fallback voting displays
the broadest control resistance currently known to hold among natural election systems with a
polynomial-time winner problem. We also study the control complexity of Bucklin voting and
show that it performs at least almost as well as fallback voting in terms of control resistance.
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posium [ER10], in the proceedings of the Tenth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Sys-
tems [EPR11], and in the proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Computational Social Choice [EF10a].
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As Bucklin voting is a special case of fallback voting, each resistance shown for Bucklin voting
strengthens the corresponding resistance for fallback voting.
Such worst-case complexity analysis is at best an indication of security against control at-
tempts, rather than a proof. In practice, the difficulty of control will depend on the structure of
typical instances. Parameterized complexity is a way of accounting for such structure in study-
ing computational complexity. We investigate the parameterized control complexity of Bucklin
and fallback voting, according to several parameters that are often likely to be small for typical
instances. Our results, though still in the worst-case complexity model, can be interpreted as
significant strengthenings of the resistance demonstrations based on NP-hardness.
1 Introduction
Since the seminal paper of Bartholdi et al. [BTT92], the computational complexity of electoral con-
trol has been studied for a variety of voting systems. Unlike manipulation [BTT89, BO91, CSL07],
which models attempts of strategic voters to influence the outcome of an election by casting insin-
cere votes, control models attempts of an external actor, the “chair,” to tamper with an election’s
participation structure so as to alter its outcome via such actions as adding/deleting/partitioning
either candidates or voters. A third way of tampering with the outcome of elections is bribery
[FHH09, FHHR09a], which shares with manipulation the feature that votes are being changed, and
with control the aspect that an external actor tries to change the outcome of an election. (We do not
here investigate resistance to bribery.) Faliszewski et al. [FHH10, FHHR09b] and Conitzer [Con10]
comprehensively survey known complexity results for control, manipulation, and bribery for var-
ious voting systems; Faliszewski and Procaccia [FP10] do so with a focus on manipulation; and
Baumeister et al. [BEH+10] do so with a particular emphasis on approval voting and its variants.
Elections have been used for preference aggregation not only in the context of politics and
human societies, but also in artificial intelligence, especially in multiagent systems, and other ap-
plied settings in computer science; see, e.g., [ER97, GMHS99, DKNS01]. In general, information
increasingly arises from multiple perspectives, and must be collated—one way of thinking about
election systems that points to the rich range of applications. The investigation of the computational
properties of voting systems is thus well-motivated and the robustness and resistance to manipula-
tion, control, and bribery in voting is of fundamental interest, but how can this be investigated and
such desirable properties be established, evidenced, or indicated?
In their path-breaking papers Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89, BTT92] proposed to employ
computational complexity to explore this issue: If the problem of deciding whether an election can
be tampered with in the manipulation or control scenario at hand is NP-hard, then this is evidence
that the system is intrinsically difficult to manipulate or to control in this scenario, because of the
computational intractability of mounting an attack. In this perspective, a central quest that has
emerged in the past two decades of research is to find natural voting systems with polynomial-time
winner determination that are computationally resistant to as many of the common 22 control types
as possible, where resistance means that the corresponding control problem is NP-hard. Each con-
trol type is either constructive (the chair of the election seeks to insure that some favored candidate
wins) or destructive (the chair seeks to insure that some despised candidate does not win).
We study the control complexity of fallback voting, an election system introduced by Brams
and Sanver [BS09] as a way of combining Bucklin and approval voting. We prove that fallback
voting is resistant to each of the common types of control except two (namely, it is not resistant to
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destructive control by either adding or deleting voters), and we show that it is vulnerable (i.e., the
corresponding control problem is in P) to these two control types. With these 20 control resistances,
fallback voting displays the broadest control resistance currently known to hold among natural elec-
tion systems with a polynomial-time winner problem. In particular, fallback voting is fully resistant
to constructive control and it is fully resistant to candidate control.
As the two control types for which fallback voting is vulnerable are destructive types and as
destructive control intuitively can be seen as less important than constructive control, one may now
view the original research project that was started by Bartholdi et al. [BTT92] two decades ago
as “essentially completed,” and this is one of the main contributions of this paper. That is not
to say that, among natural voting systems with polynomial-time winner determination, fallback
voting were the one and only system with the strongest or broadest control resistance. Indeed,
shortly after our results on fallback voting were made public in the predecessor [EFPR11] (dated
March 11, 2011) of this technical report, Menton [Men12] reported analogous results for normalized
range voting (the version of his technical report that establishes a matching number of resistances
is dated April 25, 2011). It is very well conceivable that also other voting systems have the same
resistances and vulnerabilities as fallback voting, and there might even be such a system that in
addition is resistant to the two types of destructive control where fallback voting lacks resistance. By
“essentially completed” we merely mean that fallback voting is the first natural voting system with
polynomial-time winner determination shown to display such an almost complete control resistance.
Fallback voting is a hybrid system combining approval and Bucklin voting, and it is clear that
each of these two constituent “pure” systems are certainly more natural than their hybrid. There-
fore, we also study the control complexity of Bucklin voting itself. While many important voting
systems—including plurality, Condorcet, Copeland, maximin, and approval voting—have already
been investigated with respect to electoral control (see the references in “Related Work” below),
Bucklin voting is one of the few central voting systems for which a thorough study of the control
complexity has been missing to date. We show that Bucklin voting has no more than one control
resistance fewer than fallback voting (namely, possibly, regarding destructive control to partition of
voters in the tie-handling model TP, see Section 2.2 for the definition). In particular, Bucklin voting
is also fully resistant to constructive control and fully resistant to candidate control. Since Bucklin
voting is a special case of fallback voting, each resistance result for Bucklin voting strengthens the
corresponding resistance result for fallback voting.
Now that the program of investigating electoral control resistance issues in terms of NP-hardness
is “essentially completed” with the results in this paper, it is appropriate to revisit the roots of the
program. In particular, what do resistance results based on NP-hardness results actually mean in
practice, that is, for “typical” elections?
We study the parameterized complexity of some of the key control problems in natural param-
eterizations. Parameterized complexity allows a more fine-grained deployment of computational
complexity, having the ability to model more closely “typical input structure.”1 In particular, we
obtain W[2]-hardness results for problems related to adding/deleting either candidates or voters,
parameterized by the number of candidates/voters that have been added/deleted.
1We stress that “typical input structure” is different from (and should not be confused with) the “typical elections”
used in, e.g., the experimental results conducted by Rothe and Schend [RS12a, RS12b] for Bucklin, fallback, and plurality
voting. While the former refers to typical parameters in the parameterized control problems we study, the latter refers to
generating typical elections according to some distribution model.
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Related Work: The study of electoral control was initiated by Bartholdi et al. [BTT92], who in-
troduced a number of constructive control types and investigated plurality and Condorcet voting
in this regard. The common types of destructive control were proposed by Hemaspaandra, Hema-
spaandra, and Rothe [HHR07], who studied destructive control for plurality and Condorcet voting
and constructive and destructive control for approval voting. Plurality voting was the first natural
system (among those having a polynomial-time winner problem) found to be fully resistant to can-
didate control. Faliszewski et al. [FHHR09a] studied the control complexity of the whole family of
Llull/Copeland voting systems and were the first to find a natural voting system that is resistant to
all common types of constructive control.2 Another such voting system with full resistance to con-
structive control, and also to candidate control, is sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting
(SP-AV), as shown by Erde´ly, Nowak, and Rothe [ENR09]. Prior to this paper, SP-AV was the
voting system displaying the broadest control resistance among natural systems with a polynomial-
time winner problem. However, SP-AV (as modified by Erde´ly, Nowak, and Rothe [ENR09]) is
arguably less natural a system than fallback voting.3 Note also that plurality has fewer resistances
to voter control and Copeland voting has fewer resistances to destructive control than either of Buck-
lin and fallback voting. If we disregard SP-AV for the reasons mentioned in Footnote 3, all “natural”
systems with polynomial-time winner determination (whose control behavior has been studied pre-
viously) are vulnerable to considerably more control types than Bucklin or fallback voting: plurality
to six types, both Copeland and Condorcet to seven types, Llull to eight types, and approval voting
to nine types. As mentioned above, shortly after our results were made public, Menton [Men12]
showed that normalized range voting has the same number of resistances as fallback voting.
The parameterized complexity of electoral control has been studied by Betzler and Betzler
and Uhlmann [BU09] and Faliszewski et al. [FHHR09a] for Llull/Copeland voting, by Liu et
al. [LFZL09] for plurality, Condorcet, and approval voting, and by Liu and Zhu [LZ10] for maximin
voting.
Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [FHH11] study control for a more flexible type
of attack (so-called “multimode control”) and focus more on “combined” vulnerability than resis-
tance. Meir et al. [MPRZ08] consider a different type of control scenario as well, using utility func-
tions rather than constructive/destructive control, and they restrict their attention to adding/deleting
candidates/voters. Both papers just mentioned study different voting systems. Recently, Hema-
spaandra et al. [HHR12b, HHR12c] investigated online control in sequential elections, which is
quite a different model than standard control in simultaneous elections studied here, see also their
related work [HHR12a] on online manipulation in sequential elections.
As mentioned earlier, manipulation is related to, but different from control and has been stud-
ied even more extensively, in particular in [BTT89, BO91, CSL07, CS03, EL05, BEF11, OEH11,
2Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR09] construct, via “hybridization,” a system with perfect control
resistance. However, this system is artificial and shouldn’t be used in practice, and it was not designed for that purpose.
3SP-AV is another hybrid system combining approval and preference-based voting; Brams and Sanver [BS06] pro-
posed the original system and Erde´ly, Nowak, and Rothe [ENR09] its modification SP-AV. The reason why we said
SP-AV is less natural than fallback voting is that, to preserve the votes’ “admissibility” (as required by Brams and San-
ver [BS06] to preclude trivial approval strategies), SP-AV employs an additional rule to (re-)coerce admissibility if in the
course of a control action an originally admissible vote becomes inadmissible. As discussed in detail by Baumeister et
al. [BEH+10], this rule, if applied, changes the approval strategies of the originally cast votes—a severe drawback. In
contrast, here we study the original fallback voting system of Brams and Sanver [BS09] where votes, once cast, do not
change.
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FHS10, FHS08, IKM10, MR12, XZP+09, XC08a, XC08b, FHHR11, BBHH10]. Elkind and
Erde´lyi [EE12] follow up the approach to consider voting rule uncertainty proposed by Baumeister,
Roos, and Rothe [BRR11] for the more general possible winner problem. Much of this work has
been surveyed in [FHH10, FP10, Con10, BEH+10, FHHR09b]. Among the recent highlights re-
garding manipulation are the papers by Betzler, Niedermeier, and Woeginger [BNW11] and Davies
et al. [DKNW11], who built on earlier work by Xia, Conitzer, and Procaccia [XCP10] to show that
Borda voting is NP-hard to manipulate, even with only two manipulators and even in the unweighted
case.
Note that all our NP-hardness results regard control problems with unweighted votes as well.
It is worthwhile to explain the similarities and differences between manipulation and control at
this example. Betzler, Niedermeier, and Woeginger [BNW11] describe the unweighted coalitional
manipulation problem on p. 55 as follows: “Can one add a certain number of additional votes (called
manipulators) to an election such that a distinguished candidate becomes a winner?” This problem
is somewhat reminiscent of constructive control by adding voters. However, while the manipulators
are free to choose their votes at will, the chair exerting control is restricted to a pool of given votes
to choose from.4
Organization: This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall some notions from
social choice theory, define the commonly studied types of control, and explain Bucklin voting and
the fallback voting procedure of Brams and Sanver [BS09] in detail. Our results on the classical and
parameterized control complexity of Bucklin voting and fallback voting are presented in Section 3.
Finally, Section 4 provides some conclusions and open questions.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Elections and Voting Systems
An election (C,V ) is given by a finite set C of candidates and a finite list V of votes over C. A
voting system is a rule that specifies how to determine the winner(s) of any given election. The
two voting systems considered in this paper are Bucklin voting and fallback voting. Bucklin vot-
ing is named after James W. Bucklin and was used from 1909 till 1922 in Grand Junction, Col-
orado [HH26]. Bucklin voting is therefore also referred to as Grand Junction voting. Between
1910 and 1917, it was also adopted in real elections in many other cities in the United States
(see, e.g., http://www.electology.org/bucklin); although named “Bucklin voting,” the sys-
tem they used was actually what Brams and Sanver [BS09] introduced as fallback voting, a hybrid
voting system that combines Bucklin with approval voting. For the social-choice properties of these
systems, we refer to [HH26, BF78, BF83, BF02, RBLR11].
In Bucklin voting, votes are represented as (strict) linear orders over C, i.e., each voter ranks all
candidates according to his or her preferences. For example, if C = {a,b,c,d} then a vote might
look like c d a b, i.e., this voter (strictly) prefers c to d, d to a, and a to b. Given an election
(C,V ) and a candidate c ∈C, define the level i score of c in (C,V ) (denoted by scorei(C,V )(c)) as the
4Note also that for most voting systems the NP-hardness reductions for control by adding voters tend to be easier than
those for control by partition of voters; compare, e.g., the proof of Theorem 3.14 with Theorems 3.22, 3.26, and 3.30 (the
latter two using Constructions 3.24 and 3.28 and Lemmas 3.25 and 3.29).
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number of votes in V that rank c among their top i positions. Denoting the strict majority threshold
for a list V of voters by maj(V ) = ⌊‖V‖/2⌋+ 1, the Bucklin score of c in (C,V ) is the smallest i
such that scorei(C,V )(c)≥ maj(V ). All candidates with a smallest Bucklin score, say k, and a largest
level k score are the Bucklin winners (BV winners, for short) in (C,V ). If some candidate becomes
a Bucklin winner on level k, we call him or her a level k BV winner in (C,V ). Note that a level 1
BV winner must be unique, but there may be more level k BV winners than one for k > 1, i.e., an
election may have more than one Bucklin winner in general.
In approval voting, votes are represented by approval vectors in {0,1}‖C‖ (with respect to a
fixed order of the candidates in C), where 0 stands for disapproval and 1 stands for approval. Given
an election (C,V ) and a candidate c ∈ C, define the approval score of c in (C,V ) (denoted by
score(C,V )(c)) as the number of c’s approvals in (C,V ), and all candidates with a largest approval
score are the approval winners in (C,V ). Note that an election may have more than one approval
winner.
Fallback voting combines Bucklin with approval voting as follows. Each voter provides both an
approval vector and a linear ordering of all approved candidates. The subset of candidates approved
by a voter is also called his or her approval strategy. For simplicity, we will omit the disapproved
candidates in each vote.5 For example, if C = {a,b,c,d} and a voter approves of a, c, and d but
disapproves of b, and prefers c to d and d to a, then this vote will be written as: c d a. We will
always explicitly state the candidate set, so it will always be clear which candidates participate in
an election and which of them are disapproved by which voter (namely those not occurring in his or
her vote). Given an election (C,V ) and a candidate c ∈C, the notions of level i score of c in (C,V )
and level k fallback voting winner (level k FV winner, for short) in (C,V ) are defined analogously
to the case of Bucklin voting, and if there exists a level k FV winner for some k ≤ ‖C‖, he or she
is called a fallback winner (FV winner, for short) in (C,V ). However, unlike in Bucklin voting, in
fallback voting it may happen that no candidate reaches a strict majority for any level, due to voters
being allowed to disapprove of (any number of) candidates, so it may happen that for no k ≤ ‖C‖
a level k FV winner exists. In such a case, every candidate with a largest (approval) score is an FV
winner in (C,V ). Note that Bucklin voting is the special case of fallback voting where each voter
approves of all candidates.
As a notation, when a vote contains a subset of the candidate set, such as c D a for a subset
D ⊆ C, this is a shorthand for c d1 · · · dℓ a, where the elements of D = {d1, . . . ,dℓ} are ranked
with respect to some (tacitly assumed) fixed ordering of all candidates in C. For example, if C =
{a,b,c,d} is assumed to be ordered lexicographically and D = {b,d} then “c D a” is a shorthand
for the vote c b d a. If the candidate set is downsized in the process of a control action, the deleted
candidates are removed in every vote, e.g., a vote a c b d over the candidate set C = {a,b,c,d} is
altered to c d if the subset C′ = {c,d} of candidates is considered.
2.2 Types of Electoral Control
There are eleven types of electoral control, each coming in two variants. In constructive control
[BTT92], the chair tries to make his or her favorite candidate win; in destructive control [HHR07],
the chair tries to prevent a despised candidate’s victory. We refrain from giving a detailed discussion
5Erde´lyi and Rothe [ER10] use a slightly different notation by separating the approved candidates from the disap-
proved candidates by a line, where all candidates to the left of this line are ranked and those to its right are unranked.
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of natural, real-life scenarios for each of these 22 standard control types that motivate them; these
can be found in, e.g., [BTT92, HHR07, FHHR09a, HHR09, ENR09]. However, we stress that every
control type is motivated by an appropriate real-life scenario, and we will briefly point some of them
out below.
When we now formally define our 22 standard control types as decision problems, we assume
that each election or subelection in these control problems will be conducted with the voting system
at hand (i.e., either Bucklin or fallback voting) and that each vote will be represented as required
by the corresponding voting system. We also assume that the chair has complete knowledge of the
voters’ preferences and/or approval strategies. This assumption may be considered to be unrealistic
in certain settings, but is reasonable and natural in certain others, including small-scale elections
among humans and even large-scale elections among software agents. More to the point, assuming
the chair to have complete information makes sense for our results, as most of our results are NP-
hardness lower bounds showing resistance of a voting system against specific control attempts and
complexity lower bounds in the complete-information model are inherited by any natural partial-
information model; see [HHR07] for a more detailed discussion of this point.
2.2.1 Control by Adding Candidates
We formally state our control problems in the common instance/question format. We start with the
four problems modeling control by adding candidates. In these control scenarios, the chair seeks
to make his or her favorite candidate win (in the constructive cases) or prevent a victory of his or
her despised candidate (in the destructive cases) via introducing new candidates from a given pool
of spoiler candidates into the election. Faliszewski et al. [FHHR09a] formalize this problem as
follows. (In the definitions of control problems below, whenever we have a proper candidate subset
C′ ⊂C for an election (C,V ) then (C′,V ) denotes the election where the voters in V are restricted
to C′.)
CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY ADDING A LIMITED NUMBER OF CANDIDATES (CCAC)
Given: An election (C∪D,V ), C∩D = /0, a distinguished candidate c ∈C, and a nonnegative
integer k. (C is the set of originally qualified candidates and D is the set of spoiler
candidates that may be added.)
Question: Does there exist a subset D′ ⊆ D such that ‖D′‖ ≤ k and c is the unique winner (under
the election system at hand) of election (C∪D′,V )?
CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY ADDING AN UNLIMITED NUMBER OF CANDIDATES, the
problem variant originally proposed by Bartholdi et al. [BTT92], is the same except there is no
limit k on the number of spoiler candidates that may be added. We abbreviate this problem variant
by CCAUC. Faliszewski et al. [FHHR09a] discuss in detail the reasons of why it makes sense to
also consider the limited version of the problem. Although the difference in the definitions may ap-
pear to be negligible, note that the complexity of these problems differs significantly in some cases,
e.g., in Llull’s voting system [FHHR09a].
The destructive variants of both problems defined above are obtained by asking whether c is not
a unique winner of (C∪D′,V ). We use the shorthands DCAUC and DCAUC.
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2.2.2 Control by Deleting Candidates
This control problem is defined analogously to control by adding a limited number of candidates, ex-
cept that the chair now seeks to make a distinguished candidate c win by deleting up to k candidates
from the given election.6 This control scenario models candidate suppression. For example, by
deleting certain candidates other than c the chair may hope that their voters swing to now support c.
CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY DELETING CANDIDATES (CCDC)
Given: An election (C,V ), a distinguished candidate c ∈C, and a nonnegative integer k.
Question: Does there exist a subset C′ ⊆C such that ‖C′‖ ≤ k and c is the unique winner (under
the election system at hand) of election (C−C′,V )?
The destructive version of this problem is the same except that the chair now wants to preclude
c from being a unique winner (and, to prevent the problem from being trivial, simply deleting c is
not allowed). We use the shorthand DCDC.
2.2.3 Control by Partition or Run-Off Partition of Candidates
Both CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY PARTITION OF CANDIDATES and CONSTRUCTIVE CON-
TROL BY RUN-OFF PARTITION OF CANDIDATES take as input an election (C,V ) and a candidate
c ∈C and ask whether c can be made the unique winner in a certain two-stage election consisting
of one (in the partition case) or two (in the run-off partition case) first-round subelection(s) and a
final round. In both variants, following Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR07], we
consider two tie-handling rules, TP (“ties promote”) and TE (“ties eliminate”), that enter into force
when more candidates than one are tied for winner in any of the first-round subelections:
CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY RUN-OFF PARTITION OF CANDIDATES WITH TP RULE (CCRPC-TP)
Given: An election (C,V ) and a distinguished candidate c ∈C.
Question: Is it possible to partition C into C1 and C2 such that c is the unique winner (under the
election system at hand) of election (W1 ∪W2,V ), where Wi, i ∈ {1,2}, is the set of
winners of subelection (Ci,V )?
CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY PARTITION OF CANDIDATES WITH TP RULE (CCPC-TP)
Given: An election (C,V ) and a distinguished candidate c ∈C.
Question: Is it possible to partition C into C1 and C2 such that c is the unique winner (under the
election system at hand) of election (W1 ∪C2,V ), where W1 is the set of winners of
subelection (C1,V )?
In both cases, when the TE rule is used, none of multiple, tied first-round subelection winners
is promoted to the final round. For example, if we have a run-off and ‖W2‖ ≥ 2 then the final-round
election collapses to (W1,V ); only a unique first-round subelection winner is promoted to the final
round in TE. We abbreviate these two problem variants by CCRPC-TE and CCPC-TE. Note that
6No unlimited version has been considered previously for this control type or for the types of control by adding or
deleting voters to be defined below.
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the candidate set in the final round can be empty when the TE rule is used. In this case the resulting
two-stage election has no winner. The following example gives a real-life scenario of a two-stage
election as it can result from control by partition of candidates (although this is not an example of
actually exerting this control type).
Example 2.1 In the Eurovision Song Contest, which has been broadcast annually since 1956 on
live television in Europe and other parts of the world (e.g., in more than 130 countries in 2006),
each participating country submits a song (that has previously been selected in a national competi-
tion) and casts votes for the other countries’ songs. The active member countries of the European
Broadcasting Union (EBU) are eligible to participate in this competition. Since 2000, however,
four EBU member countries have a privileged status because they are the four biggest financial
contributors to the EBU: France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom—the “Big Four”—are
automatically qualified for the final round of the Eurovision Song Contest, whereas the other can-
didates have to participate in the semi-finals first to determine who among them enters the final
round. Since 2011 Italy is also enjoying this privileged status, thus forming with the other countries
the “Big Five.” This is loosely reminiscent of a CCPC-TP scenario, where the participating coun-
tries are partitioned into C = C1 ∪C2, C1 consisting of the semi-finalists and C2 consisting of the
Big Four/Five, such that all winners of the semi-finals (as modeled by the TP rule) move forward to
the final round to run against the Big Four/Five.
Other real-life examples include sports tournaments in which certain teams (such as last year’s
champion and the team hosting this year’s championship) are given an exemption from qualification.
It is obvious how to obtain the destructive variants of these four problems formalizing control by
candidate partition. We use the shorthands DCRPC-TP, DCPC-TP, DCRPC-TE, and DCPC-TE.
Summing up, we now have defined 14 candidate control problems.
2.2.4 Control by Adding Voters
Turning now to the voter control problems, we start with control by adding voters. This control
scenario models attempts by the chair to influence the outcome of elections via introducing new
voters. There are many ways of introducing new voters into an election—think, for example, of
“get-out-the-vote” drives, or of lowering the age-limit for the right to vote, or of attracting new
voters with certain promises or even small gifts.
CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY ADDING VOTERS (CCAV)
Given: An election (C,V ∪V ′), V ∩V ′ = /0, where V is a list of registered voters and V ′ a pool
of as yet unregistered voters that can be added, a distinguished candidate c ∈C, and a
nonnegative integer k.
Question: Does there exist a sublist V ′′ ⊆ V ′ of size at most k such that c is the unique winner
(under the election system at hand) of election (C,V ∪V ′′)?
The destructive variant of this problem is the same except that the chair now wants to preclude
c from being a unique winner. We use the shorthand DCAV.
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2.2.5 Control by Deleting Voters
Disenfranchisement and other means of voter suppression is modeled as control by deleting voters.
CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY DELETING VOTERS (CCDV)
Given: An election (C,V ), a distinguished candidate c ∈C, and a nonnegative integer k.
Question: Does there exist a sublist V ′ ⊆V such that ‖V ′‖ ≤ k and c is the unique winner (under
the election system at hand) of election (C,V −V ′)?
Again, the destructive variant of this problem is the same except that the chair now wants to
preclude c from being a unique winner. We use the shorthand DCDV.
2.2.6 Control by Partition of Voters
CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY PARTITION OF VOTERS (CCPV-TP)
Given: An election (C,V ) and a distinguished candidate c ∈C.
Question: Is it possible to partition V into V1 and V2 such that c is the unique winner (under the
election system at hand) of election (W1 ∪W2,V ), where Wi, i ∈ {1,2}, is the set of
winners of subelection (C,Vi)?
The destructive variant of this problem, denoted by DCPV-TP, is defined analogously, except
it asks whether c is not a unique winner of this two-stage election. In both variants, if one uses
the tie-handling model TE instead of TP in the two first-stage subelections, a winner w of (C,V1)
or (C,V2) proceeds to the final stage if and only if w is the only winner of his or her subelection.
We use the shorthands CCPV-TE and DCPV-TE. Each of the four problems just defined models
“two-district gerrymandering” (see e.g. [Bal08] for further information on district-gerrymandering
in general).
Summing up, we now have defined eight voter control problems and thus a total of 22 control
problems.
2.3 Classical and Parameterized Complexity
We assume the reader is familiar with the basic complexity classes such as P and NP. In classical
complexity theory, a decision problem A (polynomial-time many-one) reduces to a decision problem
B if there is a polynomial-time computable function f such that for all inputs x, x is a yes-instance
for problem A if and only if f (x) is a yes-instance for problem B. A problem B is NP-hard if every
NP problem A reduces to B, and B is NP-complete if it is NP-hard and in NP. A problem B is
shown to be NP-hard by exhibiting a reduction to B from a problem A that is already known to be
NP-hard. More background on (classical) complexity theory can be found, e.g., in the textbooks by
Papadimitriou [Pap94] and Rothe [Rot05].
The theory of parameterized complexity was introduced by Downey and Fellows [DF99] based
on a series of papers in the early 1990s and has developed into a vigorous branch of contemporary
computer science, having strong applications in such areas as artificial intelligence and computa-
tional biology. The main idea is that for most NP-hard problems, typical inputs have secondary
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structure beyond the instance size measure n that may significantly affect problem complexity in
real-world computing contexts.
As a simple concrete illustration of the issue, the problem ML TYPE CHECKING, concerned
with checking the consistency of type declarations in the ML programming language, was noted to
be easy to solve in practice, despite being NP-hard. The explanation is that the relevant algorithm
runs in time O(2kn), where n is the instance size (here, the length of the ML program), and k is the
secondary measurement: the maximum nesting depth of the type declarations. For real-world ML
programs, usually k ≤ 3 and the algorithm easily solves the problem for typical instances.
This concrete example leads to the general setup of parameterized complexity theory. A param-
eterized decision problem is a decision problem in the classical sense, together with a specification
of the secondary measurement (the parameter) of interest. The parameter may be an aggregate of
several secondary measurements. The central notion is fixed-parameter tractability (FPT), mean-
ing solvability in time f (k)nc, where f is an arbitrary function, and c is a fixed constant. One can
see that this generalizes polynomial time to this explicitly multivariate (two-dimensional) setting of
parameterized decision problems.
There are some parameterized decision problems that seem not to admit fixed-parameter
tractable algorithms. The well known graph problem VERTEX COVER, parameterized by the size
of a solution set of vertices, is fixed-parameter tractable, with an algorithm having the same running
time as in the above ML TYPE CHECKING example: O(2kn), where here n is the number of vertices
in the instance graph, and k is the solution size. In contrast, the graph problem DOMINATING SET,
parameterized by the size of a solution set of vertices, seems to admit no algorithm significantly
better than O(nk), based on brute force examination of all up-to-k-subsets of the vertices.
Just as classical complexity is built from essentially four main ingredients:
• The central (desirable) notion of polynomial-time complexity.
• The notion of polynomial-time many-one reducibility that “transmits” the issue of
polynomial-time solvability downward in the sense that if a decision problem A reduces to a
decision problem B, and if B is polynomial-time solvable, then A is as well.
• There is a hierarchy of classes of problems that are considered unlikely all to admit
polynomial-time algorithms, e.g., NP and beyond; see, e.g., the textbook by Rothe [Rot05]
for various hierarchies built upon NP.
• This consideration is supported by a highly plausible conjecture (namely, that P differs from
NP) concerning the difficulty of analyzing the behavior of nondeterministic Turing machines.
Parameterized complexity is similarly structured:
• The central (desirable) outcome in the two-dimensional setting is fixed-parameter tractability.
• There is a corresponding notion of reduction between parameterized problems that transmits
the issue of FPT solvability downward (see below for the definition).
• There is a hierarchy of presumably intractable parameterized problem classes; see below and,
e.g., the monograph by Downey and Fellows [DF99].
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• The presumption is underwritten by a highly plausible conjecture concerning the difficulty of
analyzing the behavior of nondeterministic Turing machines, that is a natural (parameterized)
variation on the central classical complexity conjecture.
Definition 2.2 (Downey and Fellows [DF99]) 1. A parameterized decision problem is a lan-
guage L ⊆ Σ∗×N. L is fixed-parameter tractable if there exists some computable function
f such that for each input (x,k) of size n = |(x,k)|, it can be determined in time O( f (k) ·nc)
whether or not (x,k) is in L , where c is a constant.
2. Given two parameterized problems L and L ′ (both encoded over Σ∗×N), we say L param-
eterized reduces to L ′ if there is a function f : Σ∗×N→ Σ∗×N such that for each (x,k),
(a) f (x,k) = (x′,k′) can be computed in time O(g(k) · p(|x|)) for some function g and some
polynomial p, and
(b) (x,k) ∈L if and only if (x′,k′) ∈L ′, where k′ ≤ g(k) (that is, k′ depends only on k).
A parameterized problem L is hard for a parameterized complexity class C if every problem in
C parameterized reduces to L , and L is complete for C if it both belongs to C and is hard for C .
The main hierarchy of parameterized complexity classes is:
FPT = W[0]⊆ W[1]⊆ W[2]⊆ ·· · ⊆ W[t]⊆ ·· · ⊆ XP.
FPT is the class of fixed-parameter tractable problems. W[1] is a strong parameterized analogue
of NP, as the parameterized k-STEP HALTING PROBLEM FOR NONDETERMINISTIC TURING MA-
CHINES is complete for W[1] under the above notion of parameterized reducibility [DF99]. Many
classical decision problems have an obvious parameterized variant for a natural parameter. For ex-
ample, the CLIQUE problem asks, given a graph G and a positive integer k, whether G has a clique
(i.e., a subset of G’s vertices that are pairwise adjacent) of size at least k. In such cases, we let k-Π
denote this obvious parameterized variant of the classical decision problem Π. The parameterized
k-CLIQUE problem is another problem complete for W[1], and the parameterized k-DOMINATING
SET problem (which will be defined in Section 2.5) is complete for W[2]. The latter two parame-
terized problems (with parameter k, where k is the solution size) are frequent sources of reductions
that show likely parameterized intractability. XP is the class of parameterized decision problems
solvable in time O(ng(k)) for some function g.
See the monographs by Downey and Fellows [DF99], Niedermeier [Nie06], and Flum and
Grohe [FG06] for further background on parameterized complexity theory and the rich toolkit
of methods for devising fixes parameter tractable algorithms and proving parameterized hardness.
Lindner and Rothe [LR08] survey a number of FPT and parameterized complexity results in com-
putational social choice.
2.4 Immunity, Susceptibility, Resistance, and Vulnerability
Let CT be a control type; for example, CT might stand for “constructive control by partition of
voters in model TP” or any of the other types of control defined in Section 2.2. We say a voting
system is immune to CT if it is impossible for the chair to make the given candidate the unique
winner in the constructive case (not a unique winner in the destructive case) via exerting control of
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type CT. We say a voting system is susceptible to CT if it is not immune to CT. A voting system that
is susceptible to CT is said to be vulnerable to CT if the control problem corresponding to CT can
be solved in polynomial time, and is said to be resistant to CT if the control problem corresponding
to CT is NP-hard. These notions are due to Bartholdi et al. [BTT92] (except that we follow the
now more common approach of Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR09] who define
resistant to mean “susceptible and NP-hard” rather than “susceptible and NP-complete”).
In analogy to the classical complexity notion, we say that a voting system is parameterized-
resistant to CT (with respect to a specified parameter) if it is susceptible to CT and the parameterized
decision problem corresponding to CT and this parameter is W[2]-hard. For example, a natural
parameter to look at for control by deleting candidates is the number of candidates deleted.
2.5 Classical and Parameterized Decision Problems to Be Reduced From
In this section we introduce the decision problems that will be used for hardness proofs throughout
this paper. We begin with the NP-complete problem EXACT COVER BY THREE-SETS, which will
be used in Section 3.4 and is defined as follows (see, e.g., [GJ79]):
EXACT COVER BY THREE-SETS (X3C)
Given: A set B = {b1,b2, . . . ,b3m}, m > 1,7 and a collection S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} of subsets
Si ⊆ B with ‖Si‖= 3 for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Question: Is there a subcollection S ′ ⊆ S such that each element of B occurs in exactly one set
in S ′?
For the hardness proofs for several candidate control cases in Section 3.3 and one case of voter
control in Section 3.4, we will use a restricted version of the NP-complete problem HITTING SET
(see, e.g., [GJ79]), which is defined as follows:
RESTRICTED HITTING SET (RHS)
Given: A set B= {b1,b2, . . . ,bm}, a collection S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} of nonempty subsets Si ⊆B
such that n > m, and a positive integer k with 1 < k < m.
Question: Does S have a hitting set of size at most k, i.e., is there a set B′ ⊆ B with ‖B′‖ ≤ k such
that for each i, Si∩B′ 6= /0?
Note that by dropping the requirement “n > m > k > 1,” we obtain the (unrestricted) HITTING
SET problem. This restriction is needed to ensure that in the election constructed from an RHS
instance in Construction 3.24 (see page 38), the scores of certain candidates are bounded. Construc-
tion 3.24 is an adaptation to Bucklin voting of a construction due to Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra,
and Rothe [HHR07], namely Construction 4.28 in their paper, which they used to handle several
candidate control cases for plurality voting. The election constructed there starts from a differently
defined problem that is also called “RESTRICTED HITTING SET” but that is restrictive in another
sense by requiring n(k+1)≤ m− k. In both constructions, the restriction serves the same purpose:
bounding the scores of certain candidates so as to make the construction work.
Observe that our RESTRICTED HITTING SET problem is NP-complete as well, i.e., our restric-
tion does not make the problem too easy. This is stated in the following lemma.
7Note that X3C is trivial to solve for m = 1.
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Lemma 2.3 RESTRICTED HITTING SET is NP-complete.
Proof. It is immediate that RESTRICTED HITTING SET is in NP. To show NP-hardness, we
reduce the (general) HITTING SET problem to RESTRICTED HITTING SET. Let ( ˆB, ˆS , ˆk) be a given
instance of HITTING SET, where ˆB = {b1,b2, . . . ,bmˆ} is a set, ˆS = {S1,S2, . . . ,Snˆ} is a collection
of nonempty subsets of ˆB, and ˆk ≤ mˆ is a positive integer. If ˆk = mˆ or ˆk = 1, ( ˆB, ˆS , ˆk) is trivially in
HITTING SET, so we may assume that 1 < ˆk < mˆ.
Define the following instance (B,S ,k) of RESTRICTED HITTING SET:
B =
{
ˆB∪{a} if nˆ ≤ mˆ
ˆB if nˆ > mˆ,
S =
{
ˆS ∪{Snˆ+1,Snˆ+2, . . . ,Smˆ+2} if nˆ ≤ mˆ
ˆS if nˆ > mˆ,
k =
{
ˆk+1 if nˆ ≤ mˆ
ˆk if nˆ > mˆ,
where Snˆ+1 = Snˆ+2 = · · ·= Smˆ+2 = {a}.
Let n be the number of members of S and m be the number of elements of B. Since 1 < ˆk < mˆ,
we have 1 < k < m. Note that if nˆ > mˆ then (B,S ,k) = ( ˆB, ˆS , ˆk), so n = nˆ > mˆ = m; and if nˆ ≤ mˆ
then n = mˆ+ 2 > mˆ+ 1 = m. Thus, in both cases (B,S ,k) fulfills the restriction of RESTRICTED
HITTING SET.
It is easy to see that ˆS has a hitting set of size at most ˆk if and only if S has a hitting set
of size at most k. In particular, assuming nˆ ≤ mˆ, if ˆS has a hitting set B′ of size at most ˆk then
B′∪{a} is a hitting set of size at most k = ˆk+1 for S ; and if ˆS has no hitting set of size at most ˆk
then S can have no hitting set of size at most k = ˆk+1 (because a 6∈ ˆB, so {a}∩Si = /0 for each i,
1 ≤ i ≤ nˆ). ❑
Regarding parameterized complexity, many W[2]-hardness results are proven via parameterized
reductions from parameterized graph problems. We will prove W[2]-hardness of certain parameter-
ized control problems via a parameterized reduction from the k-DOMINATING SET problem, which
was shown to be W[2]-complete by Downey and Fellows [DF99]. Before we introduce this problem,
we need some basic graph-theoretic notions.
Definition 2.4 Let G = (B,A) be an undirected graph without loops or multiple edges.8
We say that two distinct vertices bi and b j are adjacent in G if and only if there is an edge
{bi,b j} ∈ A. Adjacent vertices are called neighbors in G.
The neighborhood of a vertex bi ∈ B is defined by N(bi) = {b j ∈ B | {bi,b j} ∈ A}. The closed
neighborhood of bi ∈ B is defined by N[bi] =N(bi)∪{bi}. For a subset S⊆B, the neighborhood of S
is defined as N(S) =⋃bi∈S N(bi) and the closed neighborhood of S is defined as N[S] =⋃bi∈S N[bi].
A subset B′ ⊆ B is said to be a dominating set in G if for each bi ∈ B−B′ there is a b j ∈ B′ such
that {bi,b j} ∈ A. The size of a dominating set is the number of its vertices.
8Note that we denote the vertex set of a graph not by V , as would be common, but rather by B, in order to avoid
confusion with voter lists (for which “V ” is reserved in this paper) and also in accordance with B being the base set in the
instances of the problems X3C and RHS.
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Now we can define the W[2]-complete problem k-DOMINATING SET:
k-DOMINATING SET (k-DS)
Given: A graph G = (B,A) and a positive integer k ≤ ‖B‖.
Parameter: k.
Question: Is there a dominating set of size at most k in G?
In other words, the (parameterized) dominating set problem tests, given a graph G = (B,A) and
an integer k as the parameter, whether there is a subset B′ ⊆ B of size at most k such that B = N[B′].
To distinguish the classical variant of this problem from its parameterized version just defined above,
we drop the parameter in the problem name of the latter and simply write DOMINATING SET (DS),
one of the standard NP-complete problems (see, e.g., [GJ79]).
Note that, without loss of generality, we can assume that n > 2 holds in any given DS and k-DS
instance, respectively, since the thus restricted problem remains NP-complete and W[2]-complete,
respectively.
Remark 2.5 If Π is a (classical) decision problem in P, then k-Π is in FPT for each parameter k.
This gives a useful link between the two easiness notions in classical and parameterized complexity
theory. In particular, FPT membership of a parameterized control problem (with respect to any
parameter) follows from the voting system’s vulnerability to the corresponding control type.
It may be tempting to assume there would be a similarly direct link between the hardness no-
tions in classical and parameterized complexity theory, such as “W[2]-hardness of k-Π immediately
implies NP-hardness for Π.” However, this statement is false, in general. The classical framework,
which is built around P and reductions, and the parameterized framework, which is built around
FPT and parameterized reductions, are essentially orthogonal. For concrete examples, with respect
to suitable parameters, VC-DIMENSION (VCD) is unlikely to be NP-hard but k-VCD is complete
for W[1], and TOURNAMENT DOMINATING SET (TDS) is unlikely to be NP-hard but k-TDS is
W[2]-complete,9 see [DF99] for more details. That being said, if one has a proof of, say, W[2]-
hardness by a reduction from the NP- and W[2]-complete problems DS and k-DS, respectively,
and the transformation is polynomial-time, then of course, the transformation shows both NP- and
W[2]-hardness at the same time, and we will use this fact in some of our proofs.
In the reductions to be presented in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, we will always start from a given
instance of an NP-complete and/or W[2]-complete decision problem suitable for the control problem
at hand, that is, we will always start from a given X3C, RHS, DS, or k-DS instance. In the
upcoming constructions, the set of candidates in the elections to be defined will always contain the
set B from these instances. That is, for each element (or vertex) bi ∈ B there is a candidate bi in
the election constructed, and it will always be clear from the context whether we mean an element
(or a vertex) or a candidate when writing bi. We will also refer to Si (or N[bi]) as a “subset of the
candidates,” namely, the set of candidates corresponding to the elements (or vertices) in B that are
in Si (or in vertex bi’s closed neighborhood, N[bi], 1 ≤ i ≤ n). (Recall the sets Si from the definition
of X3C and RHS and the notion of N[bi] from Definition 2.4.)
9TDS is the problem of deciding whether a given tournament has a dominating set of size at most k (the parameter
in k-TDS). VCD is related to the so-called “Vapnik–Chervonenkis dimension” (which is the parameter in k-VCD), a
problem quite central in learning theory; see [DF99] for the definition and more details.
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Fallback Voting Bucklin Voting SP-AV Approval Voting
Control by Const. Dest. Const. Dest. Const. Dest. Const. Dest.
Adding Candidates R R R R R R I V
Adding Candidates (unlimited) R∗ R∗ R∗ R∗ R R I V
Deleting Candidates R∗ R∗ R∗ R∗ R R V I
Partition of Candidates TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: R TE:V TE: ITP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: I TP: I
Run-off Partition of Candidates TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: R TE:V TE: ITP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: I TP: I
Adding Voters R∗ V R∗ V R V R V
Deleting Voters R∗ V R∗ V R V R V
Partition of Voters TE: R TE: R
∗ TE: R TE: R∗ TE: R TE: V TE: R TE: V
TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: S TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: V
Table 1: Overview of classical and parameterized complexity results for control in Bucklin and fallback
voting. Key: I = immune, S = susceptible, R = resistant, R∗ = parameterized-resistant, V = vulnerable,
TE = ties eliminate, and TP = ties promote. Results new to this paper are in boldface. Results for approval
voting are due to [HHR07]. Results for SP-AV are due to [ENR09].
3 Control Complexity in Bucklin and Fallback Voting
3.1 Overview
Table 1 shows in boldface our results on the control complexity of Bucklin voting and fallback
voting for all 22 standard control types. Since fallback voting combines Bucklin and approval
voting, the table also shows the results for approval voting due to [HHR07]. 10 The other voting
system displayed in the table, SP-AV, is yet another hybrid voting system combining approval with
preference-based voting, which has been introduced by Brams and Sanver [BS06] and modified and
studied in [ENR09]. Until now, with 19 out of 22 resistances SP-AV has been the system with the
most known resistances to electoral control among natural voting systems with polynomial-time
winner determination. Recall from Remark 2.5 that for every R∗ entry in the table (i.e., for every
W[2]-hardness with respect to the parameters stated later in our theorems and corollaries), we will
show a corresponding resistance (i.e., NP-hardness) result by essentially the same reduction. Thus,
fallback voting has 20 and Bucklin voting has 19 out of 22 resistances, so fallback voting has one
more resistance to electoral control than SP-AV and Bucklin voting at least draws level. More
importantly, however, as argued in the introduction, both fallback voting and Bucklin voting are
much more natural voting systems than SP-AV as modified by Erde´lyi, Nowak, and Rothe [ENR09].
Table 2 gives an overview of the reductions used to prove the new (i.e., boldfaced) resistance
and parameterized resistance results in Table 1. The first column states the problem from which we
reduce. The second column states the control problem shown to be (parameterized) resistant, where
the problem name has the prefix “BV” if this control problem refers to Bucklin voting (which
immediately implies hardness also for fallback voting). The only problem name with the prefix
“FV” for fallback voting, FV-DCPV-TP in the last row, refers to the case where the complexity
10Note that the results for control by adding a limited number of candidates in approval voting, though not explicitly
considered in [HHR07], can be obtained straightforwardly from their proofs for the corresponding “unlimited” adding-
candidates case.
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is open for Bucklin voting. The third column of Table 2 points at the corresponding theorem or
construction and the fourth column states whether it is a parameterized reduction or not.
Reduction from to Reference parameterized?
BV-CCDC Theorem 3.5
yes
BV-DCDC Theorem 3.6
BV-CCAV Theorem 3.14
BV-CCDV Theorem 3.18
k-DS BV-CCAC
Theorem 3.8BV-DCAC
BV-CCAUC
noBV-DCAUC
BV-DCPV-TE Construction 3.24 and Theorem 3.26 yes
BV-CCPC-TE
Construction 3.10 and Theorem 3.12
BV-CCPC-TP
BV-DCPC-TE
RHS BV-DCPC-TP
BV-CCRPC-TE
BV-CCRPC-TP no
BV-DCRPC-TE
BV-DCRPC-TP
FV-DCPV-TP Construction 3.28 and Theorem 3.30
X3C BV-CCPV-TE Theorem 3.22BV-CCPV-TP
Table 2: Overview of the reductions used to prove the new results in Table 1.
3.2 Susceptibility
If an election system E satisfies the “unique” variant of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference11
(Unique-WARP, for short), then E is immune to constructive control by adding candidates (no
matter whether a limited or an unlimited number of candidates is being added), and this observation
has been applied to approval voting [BTT92, HHR07]. Unlike approval voting, however, Bucklin
voting and fallback voting do not satisfy Unique-WARP.
Proposition 3.1 Neither Bucklin voting nor fallback voting satisfies Unique-WARP.
Proof. We show this result for Bucklin voting only; the proof for fallback voting follows im-
mediately. Consider the election (C,V ) with candidate set C = {a,b,c,d} and voter collection
11This variant of the axiom says that the unique winner w of any election is also the unique winner of every subelection
including w.
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V = (v1,v2, . . . ,v6):
(C,V ) a b c d
v1 = v2 = v3 : a c b d score1(C,V ) : 3 2 0 1
v4 = v5 : b d c a score2(C,V ) : 4 2 3 3
v6 : d a c b
Candidate a is the unique Bucklin winner of election (C,V ), reaching the strict majority threshold
on level 2 with score2(C,V )(a) = 4. By removing candidate b from the election, we get the subelection
(C′,V ) with C′ = {a,c,d}.
(C′,V ) a c d
v1 = v2 = v3 : a c d score1(C′,V ) : 3 0 3
v4 = v5 : d c a score2(C′,V ) : 4 5 3
v6 : d a c
There is no candidate on level 1 who passes the strict majority threshold. However, there are
two candidates on the second level with a strict majority, namely candidates a and c. Since
score2(C′,V )(c) = 5 > 4 = score
2
(C′,V )(a), the unique Bucklin winner of subelection (C
′,V ) is can-
didate c. Thus, Bucklin voting does not satisfy Unique-WARP. ❑
Indeed, as we will now show, Bucklin voting and fallback voting are susceptible to each of our
22 control types. Our proofs make use of the results of [HHR07] that provide general proofs of
and links between certain susceptibility cases, which we will here refer to as Theorems HHR07-
4.1, HHR07-4.2, and HHR07-4.3. For the sake of self-containment, Figure 1, which is taken from
[RBLR11, p. 199], gives an overview of the susceptibility links in various control scenarios from
these three theorems of Hemaspaandra et al. [HHR07]. An arrow between two control types in
this figure, say CT1 → CT2 means that susceptibility to CT1 implies susceptibility to CT2; and the
arrows between control types and the two properties in dashed boxes mean that (1) susceptibility
to destructive control by deleting candidates implies that Unique-WARP is violated, and (2) every
voiced12 election system is susceptible to destructive control by adding candidates. We start with
susceptibility to candidate control for Bucklin voting.
Lemma 3.2 Bucklin voting is susceptible to constructive and destructive control by adding candi-
dates (in both the “limited” and the “unlimited” case), by deleting candidates, and by partition of
candidates (with or without run-off and for each in both model TE and model TP).
Proof. From parts 1 and 2 of Theorem HHR07-4.3 (see also Figure 1) and the fact that Bucklin
voting is a voiced voting system, it follows that Bucklin voting is susceptible to constructive control
by deleting candidates and to destructive control by adding candidates (in both the “limited” and the
“unlimited” case).
Now, consider the election (C,V ) given in the proof of Proposition 3.1. The unique Bucklin
winner of the election is candidate a. Partition C into C1 = {a,c,d} and C2 = {b}. The unique
12An election system is said to be voiced if the single candidate in any one-candidate election always wins.
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CCPV-TEDCPC-TE/TP
DCAVCCAV
DCDV CCDV
DCAC
CCDC
Unique-WARP violated
DCRPC-TE/TP CCRPC-TE/TP
CCPC-TE/TP
DCDC
CCAC voiced
CCPV-TP
DCPV-TE/TP + voiced
Figure 1: Susceptibility links in various control scenarios due to [HHR07]
Bucklin winner of subelection (C1,V ) is candidate c, as shown in the proof of Proposition 3.1.
In both partition and run-off partition of candidates and for each in both tie-handling models, TE
and TP, candidate b runs against candidate c in the final stage of the election.
({b,c},V ) b c
v1 = v2 = v3 : c b score1({b,c},V ) : 2 4
v4 = v5 : b c
v6 : c b
The unique Bucklin winner is in each case candidate c. Thus, Bucklin voting is susceptible to
destructive control by partition of candidates (with or without run-off and for each in both model
TE and model TP).
By part 4 of Theorem HHR07-4.2 (see also Figure 1), Bucklin voting is also susceptible to
destructive control by deleting candidates. By part 1 of Theorem HHR07-4.1 (see also Figure 1),
Bucklin voting is also susceptible to constructive control by adding candidates (in both the “limited”
and the “unlimited” case).
Changing the roles of a and c makes c our distinguished candidate. In election (C,V ), c loses
against candidate a. By partitioning the candidates as described above, c becomes the unique Buck-
lin winner of the election. Thus, Bucklin voting is susceptible to constructive control by partition of
candidates (with or without run-off and for each in both tie-handling models, TE and TP). ❑
We now turn to susceptibility to voter control for Bucklin voting.
Lemma 3.3 Bucklin voting is susceptible to constructive and destructive control by adding voters,
by deleting voters, and by partition of voters (in both model TE and model TP).
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Proof. Consider election (C,V ), where C = {a,b,c,d} is the set of candidates and V =
(v1,v2,v3,v4) is the collection of voters with the following preferences:
(C,V ) a b c d
v1 : a c b d score1(C,V ) : 1 2 0 1
v2 : d c a b score2(C,V ) : 3 2 2 1
v3 : b a c d
v4 : b a c d
Clearly, candidate a is the unique Bucklin winner of (C,V ) on the second level. We partition V into
V1 = (v1,v2) and V2 = (v3,v4). Thus we split (C,V ) into two subelections:
(C,V1) and (C,V2) a b c d a b c d
v1 : a c b d score1(C,V1) : 1 0 0 1 score
1
(C,V2) : 0 2 0 0
v2 : d c a b score2(C,V1) : 1 0 2 1
v3 : b a c d
v4 : b a c d
However, c is the unique Bucklin winner of (C,V1) and b is the unique Bucklin winner of (C,V2),
and so a is not promoted to the final stage. Thus, Bucklin voting is susceptible to destructive control
by partition of voters in both tie-handling models, TE and TP.
With this and by part 1 of Theorem HHR07-4.3 (see also Figure 1) and the fact that Bucklin
voting is a voiced voting system, Bucklin voting is susceptible to destructive control by deleting
voters. By part 3 of Theorem HHR07-4.1 (see also Figure 1), Bucklin voting is also susceptible to
constructive control by adding voters.
By changing the roles of a and c again, we can see that Bucklin voting is susceptible to construc-
tive control by partition of voters in both model TE and model TP. By part 3 of Theorem HHR07-4.2
(see also Figure 1), Bucklin voting is also susceptible to constructive control by deleting voters. Fi-
nally, again by part 4 of Theorem HHR07-4.1 (see also Figure 1), Bucklin voting is susceptible to
destructive control by adding voters. ❑
Since Bucklin voting is a special case of fallback voting, fallback voting is also susceptible to
all 22 common types of control.
Corollary 3.4 Fallback voting is susceptible to each of the 22 control types defined in Section 2.2.
3.3 Candidate Control
In this section, we show the (parameterized) resistance results for candidate control in Bucklin and
fallback voting. Recall from Section 2.4 that “parameterized resistance” (indicated by the R∗ entries
in Table 1) refers to W[2]-hardness of the corresponding control problem with respect to a specified
parameter, and “resistance” (indicated by the R entries in Table 1) refers to NP-hardness of the
corresponding control problem. Also, recall from Section 2.5 that in the reductions to be presented
in this section, the elections constructed will always contain a subset B of candidates, where each
candidate bi corresponds to the element bi from the set B given in the (parameterized) decision
problem the reduction starts from. It will always be clear from the context whether a candidate or
an element is meant by bi.
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3.3.1 Control by Deleting Candidates
Theorem 3.5 Bucklin voting is resistant to constructive control by deleting candidates, and is
parameterized-resistant when this control problem is parameterized by the number of candidates
deleted.
Proof. In light of Remark 2.5 it is enough to give just one reduction to prove both claims at the
same time. Let (G,k) with G = (B,E) be a given instance of k-DOMINATING SET as described in
Section 2.5. Without loss of generality, we may assume that k < n = ‖B‖, since the set B of all
vertices trivially is a dominating set in G.
Define the election (C,V ), where C = B∪D∪{w} ∪X ∪Y is the set of candidates, w is the
distinguished candidate, D is a set of “co-winners” (see below), and X and Y are sets of padding
candidates.13
Co-winners in D: D is a set of k + 1 candidates that tie with w. These candidates prevent that
deleting up to k co-winners of (C,V ) makes w the unique winner.
Padding candidates in X: X is a set of n(n+ k)−∑ni=1 ‖N[bi]‖ candidates such that for each i,
1 ≤ i≤ n, we can find a subset Xi ⊆ X with n+ k−‖N[bi]‖ elements such that Xi∩X j = /0 for
all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} with i 6= j. These subsets ensure that w is always placed at the (n+k+1)st
position in the first voter group of V below.
Padding candidates in Y: Y is a set of n(k+1) candidates such that for each j, 1 ≤ i ≤ k+1, we
can find a subset Yj ⊆ Y with n elements such that Yi∩Yj = /0 for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,k+1} with
i 6= j. These subsets ensure that each d j ∈ D is always placed at the (n+ k+1)st position in
the second voter group of V below.
V is the following collection of 2n voters, so that we have a strict majority with n+1 votes:
# For each . . . number of votes ranking of candidates
1 i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} 1 N[bi] Xi w ((B−N[bi])∪ (X −Xi)∪Y ) D
2 j ∈ {1, . . . ,k+1} 1 Yj (D−{d j}) d j (B∪X ∪ (Y −Yj)∪{w})
3 n− k−1 D (X ∪Y ∪{w}) B
4 1 D w (B∪X ∪Y)
5 1 X Y B (D∪{w})
Note that when up to k candidates are deleted (no matter which ones), the candidates from D
can never be among the top n+ k candidates in the votes of the first voter group. Table 3 shows the
scores on the relevant levels of the relevant candidates in election (C,V ).
Note that the candidates in D and candidate w are the only level n+ k+ 1 Bucklin winners of
election (C,V ), since there is no other candidate reaching a strict majority of n+1 votes or more on
any level up to n+ k+1.
13Note that in this construction as well as in later constructions, the subsets of padding candidates are always con-
structed so as to ensure that, at least up to a certain level, no padding candidate scores enough points to be relevant for
the outcome of the election. So in the following argument the padding candidates are mainly ignored and their scores are
not listed in the overview tables.
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bi ∈ B w d j ∈ D
scorek+1 ≤ n 0 n− k
scorek+2 ≤ n 1 n− k
scoren+k ≤ n 1 n
scoren+k+1 ≤ n n+1 n+1
Table 3: Level i scores in (C,V ) for i ∈ {k+ 1,k+ 2,n+ k,n+ k+1} and the candidates in C− (X ∪Y ).
We claim that G has a dominating set of size k if and only if w can be made the unique Bucklin
winner by deleting at most k candidates.
From left to right: Suppose G has a dominating set B′ ⊆ B of size k. Delete the corresponding
candidates from C. Since B′ is a dominating set in G (i.e., B = N[B′]), every bi ∈ B has a neighbor
in B′ or is itself in B′, which means that in election (C−B′,V ) candidate w gets pushed at least
one position to the left in each of the n votes in the first voter group. So w reaches a strict majority
already on level n+ k with a score of n+ 1. Since no other candidate does so (in particular, no
candidate in D), it follows that w is the unique level n+ k Bucklin winner of (C−B′,V ).
From right to left: Suppose w can be made the unique Bucklin winner of the election by deleting
at most k candidates. Since there are k+ 1 candidates other than w (namely, those in D) having a
strict majority on level n+k+1 in election (C,V ), deleting k candidates from D is not sufficient for
making w the unique Bucklin winner of the resulting election. So by deleting at most k candidates,
w must become the unique Bucklin winner on a level lower than or equal to n+ k. This is possible
only if w is pushed at least one position to the left in all votes from the first voter group. This,
however, implies that the k′ ≤ k deleted candidates are either
1. all contained in B and correspond to a dominating set of size k′ for G, or
2. are in B∪X .
Note that not all deleted candidates can be contained in X , since k < n and the sets Xi, 1≤ i≤ n, are
pairwise disjoint. If some of the k′ deleted candidates are in X , say ℓ < k′ of them, let B′ be the set
containing the k′− ℓ other candidates that have been deleted. For each i, 1≤ i≤ n, if in the ith voter
of the first group no candidate from N[bi] was deleted but a candidate x j from Xi, add an arbitrary
candidate from N[bi] to B′ instead of x j. This yields again a dominating set of size k′ for G. In both
cases, if k′ < k then by adding k− k′ further candidates from B (which is possible due to k < n) we
obtain a dominating set of size k for G.
Note that this polynomial-time reduction is parameterized, as the given parameter k of k-
DOMINATING SET is the same parameter k that bounds the number of candidates allowed to be
deleted in the control problem. ❑
Theorem 3.6 Bucklin voting is resistant to destructive control by deleting candidates, and is para-
meterized-resistant when this control problem is parameterized by the number of candidates deleted.
Proof. In light of Remark 2.5 it is again enough to give just one reduction to prove both claims
at the same time. For the W[2]-hardness proof in the destructive case for Bucklin voting, let (G,k)
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with G = (B,E) be a given instance of k-DOMINATING SET. Define the election (C,V ), where
C = {c,w}∪B∪M1∪M2∪M3∪X ∪Y ∪Z
is the candidate set, c is the distinguished candidate, and M1, M2, M3, X , Y , and Z are sets of padding
candidates (recall Footnote 13).
Padding candidates in M1, M2, and M3: M1, M2, and M3 are three pairwise disjoint sets, where
each is a set of k candidates that are positioned in the votes so as to ensure that no other
candidate besides w and c can reach a strict majority up to level n+ k.
Padding candidates in X: X is a set of n2−∑ni=1 ‖N[bi]‖ candidates such that for each i, 1≤ i≤ n,
we can find a subset Xi ⊆ X with n−‖N[bi]‖ elements such that Xi ∩X j = /0 for all i, j ∈
{1, . . . ,n} with i 6= j. These subsets ensure that w is always placed at the (n+1)st position in
the first voter group of V below.
Padding candidates in Y: Y is a set of n−1 padding candidates ensuring that c is at position n in
the votes of the second voter group of V below.
Padding candidates in Z: Z is a set of n−2 padding candidates ensuring that w is at position n−1
and c is at position n in the vote of the third voter group of V below.
V is the following collection of 2n+1 voters, so we have a strict majority threshold of n+1:
# For each . . . number of votes ranking of candidates
1 i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} 1 N[bi] Xi w M1 ((B−N[bi])∪M2∪M3∪ (X −Xi)∪Y ∪Z) c
2 n Y c M2 (B∪M1∪M3∪X ∪Z∪{w})
3 1 Z w c M3 (B∪M1∪M2∪X ∪Y )
bi ∈ B w c
scoren−1 ≤ n 1 0
scoren ≤ n 1 n+1
scoren+1 ≤ n n+1 n+1
Table 4: Level i scores in (C,V ) for i ∈ {n− 1,n,n+ 1} and the candidates in B∪{c,w}.
Table 4 gives an overview of the scores on the relevant levels of the relevant candidates in
election (C,V ). Note that candidate c is the unique level n Bucklin winner of election (C,V ),
since c is the first candidate reaching a strict majority of votes (namely, n+ 1 points on level n, as
indicated—here and in later score tables as well—by a boldfaced entry).
We claim that G has a dominating set of size k if and only if c can be prevented from being a
unique Bucklin winner by deleting at most k candidates.
From left to right: Suppose G has a dominating set B′ ⊆ B of size k. Delete the corresponding
candidates. Now candidate w moves at least one position to the left in each of the n votes in
the first voter group. Since candidate c reaches a strict majority no earlier than on level n and
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scoren(C−B′,V )(w) = n+1 = score
n
(C−B′,V )(c), candidate c is no longer a unique Bucklin winner of the
resulting election.
From right to left: Suppose c can be prevented from being a unique Bucklin winner of the
election by deleting at most k candidates. Note that deleting one candidate from an election can
move the strict majority level of another candidate at most one level to the left. Observe that only
candidate w can prevent c from winning the election, since w is the only candidate other than c
who reaches a strict majority of votes until level n+ k. In election (C,V ), candidate w reaches this
majority no earlier than on level n+1, and candidate c not before level n. Thus w can prevent c from
being a unique winner only by scoring at least as many points as c no later than on level n. This is
possible only if w is pushed at least one position to the left in all votes of the first voter group. By
an argument analogous to that given in the constructive case for this control type (see the proof of
Theorem 3.5), this implies that G has a dominating set of size k.
Note that this polynomial-time reduction is parameterized, as the given parameter k of k-
DOMINATING SET is the same parameter k that bounds the number of candidates allowed to be
deleted in the control problem. ❑
Corollary 3.7 Fallback voting is resistant to constructive and destructive control by deleting can-
didates, and is parameterized-resistant when these two control problems are parameterized by the
number of candidates deleted.
3.3.2 Control by Adding Candidates
Theorem 3.8 Bucklin voting is resistant to constructive and destructive control by adding an unlim-
ited and a limited number of candidates, and is parameterized-resistant when the limited variants
are parameterized by the number of candidates added.
Proof. We begin with the limited cases and note that again, in light of Remark 2.5 it suffices to
prove W[2]-hardness; NP-hardness follows by the same reduction. We do so first for constructive
control by adding a limited number of candidates. Let (G,k) with G = (B,E) be a given instance
of k-DOMINATING SET. Recall from Section 2.5 that without loss of generality we can assume that
n > 2 holds. Define the election (C,V ), where C = {c,w}∪X ∪Y ∪Z with X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xn−1},
Y = {y1,y2, . . . ,yn−2}, and Z = {z1,z2, . . . ,zn−1} is the set of candidates, B is the set of spoiler
candidates, w is the distinguished candidate, and V is the following collection of 2n+1 voters:
# For each . . . number of votes ranking of candidates
1 i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} 1 N[bi] X c ((B−N[bi])∪Y ∪Z∪{w})
2 n Y c w (B∪X ∪Z)
3 1 Z w c (B∪X ∪Y )
Note that the candidate subsets X , Y , and Z each contain padding candidates ensuring that
candidates w and c do not reach a strict majority of votes on a level lower than n. Table 5 shows
the relevant scores on all relevant levels in both elections, (C,V ) and (C∪B,V ), but not the scores
of the padding candidates (recall Footnote 13). Note that there is no boldfaced entry for election
(C∪B,V ) in this table, as we here give only an overview of the relevant scores; whether or not w is
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(C,V ) (C∪B,V)
w c bi ∈ B w c
scoren−1 0 n ≤ n 0 n
scoren n+1 2n ≤ n n+1 n
scoren+1 n+1 2n+1 ≤ 2n+1 n+1 ≤ 2n+1
Table 5: Level i scores in (C,V ) and (C∪B,V) for i ∈ {n− 1,n,n+ 1} and all relevant candidates.
a unique winner on level n depends on the exact score of c, which in turn depends on the structure
of the graph G.
The strict majority threshold is reached with n+ 1 points, regardless of the candidate set con-
sidered (i.e., for both (C,V ) and (C∪B,V )). Note that candidate w is not a (unique) Bucklin winner
of election (C,V ), since only candidates c and w can reach a strict majority up to level n (actually,
they do so exactly on level n), and it holds that
scoren(C,V )(w) = n+1 < 2n = score
n
(C,V )(c).
Since n > 2, c is the unique level n Bucklin winner of (C,V ).
We claim that G has a dominating set of size k if and only if w can be made the unique Bucklin
winner by adding at most k spoiler candidates from B to C.
From left to right: Suppose G has a dominating set B′ of size k. Add the corresponding candi-
dates to C. Since B′ is a dominating set in G (i.e., B = N[B′]), every bi ∈ B has a neighbor in B′ or
is itself in B′, which means that in election (C∪B′,V ) candidate c gets pushed at least one position
to the right in each of the n votes of the first voter group. Thus, c loses n points on level n, which
implies scoren(C∪B′,V )(c) = n. It follows that w is the unique Bucklin winner of (C∪B
′,V ), since w
is the only candidate on level n who has a strict majority of n+1 out of 2n+1 votes in this election.
From right to left: Suppose w can be made the unique Bucklin winner by adding some subset
B′ ⊆ B of spoiler candidates with ‖B′‖ ≤ k ≤ ‖B‖ to C. By adding any candidates from B to the
election, only votes in the first voter group can be affected in the first n levels. Note that candidate
c has already on level n− 1 a score of n from the second voter group. Thus, to make w (which
has no more than n+ 1 approvals up to level n, whatever subset of B is added) the unique Bucklin
winner, c must not gain any more points until level n (otherwise, c would tie with or beat w on
level n with scoren(C∪B′,V )(c)≥ n+1). This, however, is possible only if candidate c is pushed in all
votes from the first voter group at least one position to the right. This, in turn, is possible only if
B′ is a dominating set in G. Since k ≤ ‖B‖, we can add any k−‖B′‖ elements from B−B′ to B′ if
‖B′‖< k, yielding again a dominating set of G, so G has a dominating set of size k.
For the W[2]-hardness proof in the destructive case, we have to do only one minor change: We
switch the roles of candidates c and w, i.e., now c (instead of w) is the distinguished candidate
and the chair wishes to dethrone c. Other than that, the instance of the destructive control problem
to be constructed from a given instance of k-DOMINATING SET will be defined exactly as in the
constructive case above. Now, by an analogous argument as in the constructive case, one can show
that G has a dominating set of size k if and only if c can be prevented from being a unique Bucklin
winner by adding at most k candidates.
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Note that both reductions are parameterized, as the given parameter k of k-DOMINATING SET is
the same parameter k that bounds the number of candidates allowed to be added in the two control
problems.
The unlimited cases can be shown by the same reductions but for these cases the reductions are
not parameterized, so for these two problems we have NP-hardness. ❑
Again, since Bucklin voting is a special case of fallback voting, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.9 Fallback voting is resistant to constructive and destructive control by adding an un-
limited and a limited number of candidates, and is parameterized-resistant when the limited variants
are parameterized by the number of candidates added.
3.3.3 Control by Partition of Candidates
Construction 3.10 will be applied to prove the remaining eight cases of candidate control, estab-
lishing resistance (not parameterized resistance) in each case. This construction adapts Construc-
tion 4.28 of [HHR07], which they used to handle certain candidate control cases for plurality vot-
ing.14 Note that they start from a HITTING SET instance, while we reduce from a restricted version
of this problem, and in our construction there is one additional candidate, d, and there are two more
voter groups than in their construction. These modifications are needed because Bucklin voting is
more involved than plurality voting.
Construction 3.10 Let (B,S ,k) be a given instance of RESTRICTED HITTING SET, where B =
{b1,b2, . . . ,bm} is a set, S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} is a collection of nonempty subsets Si ⊆ B such that
n > m, and k < m is a positive integer. (Thus, n > m > k > 1.)
Define the election (C,V ), where C = B∪{c,d,w} is the candidate set and where V consists of
the following 6n(k+1)+4m+11 voters:
# For each . . . number of voters ranking of candidates
1 2m+1 c d B w
2 2n+2k(n−1)+3 c w d B
3 2n(k+1)+5 w c d B
4 i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} 2(k+1) d Si c w (B−Si)
5 j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} 2 d b j w c (B−{b j})
6 2(k+1) d w c B
The proof of Theorem 3.12, which establishes the remaining eight cases of candidate control
for Bucklin voting, will make use of Lemma 3.11 below, which is based on Claims 4.29 and 4.30
of [HHR07] but is tailored to Bucklin instead of plurality voting. As Bucklin voting is more involved
than plurality, so are our arguments in the proof of Lemma 3.11.
Lemma 3.11 Consider the election (C,V ) constructed according to Construction 3.10 from a RE-
STRICTED HITTING SET instance (B,S ,k).
14Their construction was also useful in the proofs of most candidate control results for SP-AV [ENR09], so the structure
of the constructions and the arguments in the proofs of Lemma 3.11 and Theorem 3.12 are adaptations of those by
[HHR07] and [ENR09], tailored here to Bucklin voting.
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1. c is the unique level 2 BV winner of ({c,d,w},V ).
2. If S has a hitting set B′ of size k, then w is the unique BV winner of election (B′∪{c,d,w},V ).
3. Let D ⊆ B∪{d,w}. If c is not a unique BV winner of election (D∪{c},V ), then there exists
a set B′ ⊆ B such that
(a) D = B′∪{d,w},
(b) w is a level 2 BV winner of election (B′∪{c,d,w},V ), and
(c) B′ is a hitting set for S of size at most k.
Proof. For the first part, note that there is no level 1 BV winner in election ({c,d,w},V ) and we
have the following level 2 scores in this election:
score2({c,d,w},V )(c) = 6n(k+1)+2(m− k)+9,
score2({c,d,w},V )(d) = 2n(k+1)+4m+2k+3,
score2({c,d,w},V )(w) = 4n(k+1)+2m+10.
Since n > m (which implies n > k), we have:
score2({c,d,w},V )(c)− score
2
({c,d,w},V )(d) = 4n(k+1)− (2m+4k)+6 > 0,
score2({c,d,w},V )(c)− score
2
({c,d,w},V )(w) = 2n(k+1)− (2k+1) > 0.
Thus, c is the unique level 2 BV winner of ({c,d,w},V ).
For the second part, suppose that B′ is a hitting set for S of size k. Then there is no level 1 BV
winner in election (B′∪{c,d,w},V ), and we have the following level 2 scores:
score2(B′∪{c,d,w},V )(c) = 4n(k+1)+2(m− k)+9,
score2(B′∪{c,d,w},V )(d) = 2n(k+1)+4m+2k+3,
score2(B′∪{c,d,w},V )(w) = 4n(k+1)+2(m− k)+10,
score2(B′∪{c,d,w},V )(b j) ≤ 2n(k+1)+2 for all b j ∈ B′.
It follows that w is the unique level 2 BV winner of election (B′∪{c,d,w},V ).
For the third part, let D ⊆ B∪{d,w}. Suppose c is not a unique BV winner of election (D∪
{c},V ).
(3a) Besides c, only w has a strict majority of votes on the second level and only w can tie or beat c
in (D∪{c},V ). Thus, since c is not a unique BV winner of election (D∪{c},V ), w is clearly
in D. In (D∪{c},V ), candidate w has no level 1 strict majority and candidate c has already
on level 2 a strict majority. Thus, w must tie or beat c on level 2. For a contradiction, suppose
d /∈ D. Then
score2(D∪{c},V )(c) ≥ 4n(k+1)+2m+11;
score2(D∪{c},V )(w) = 4n(k+1)+2m+10,
which contradicts the above observation that w ties with or beats c on level 2. Thus, D =
B′∪{d,w}, where B′ ⊆ B.
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(3b) This part follows immediately from the proof of part (3a).
(3c) Let ℓ be the number of sets in S not hit by B′. We have that
score2(B′∪{c,d,w},V )(w) = 4n(k+1)+10+2(m−‖B
′‖),
score2(B′∪{c,d,w},V )(c) = 2(m− k)+4n(k+1)+9+2(k+1)ℓ.
From part (3b) we know that
score2(B′∪{c,d,w},V )(w)≥ score
2
(B′∪{c,d,w},V )(c),
so
4n(k+1)+10+2(m−‖B′‖) ≥ 2(m− k)+4n(k+1)+9+2(k+1)ℓ.
The above inequality implies
1 > 1
2
≥ ‖B′‖− k+(k+1)ℓ.
Since T = ‖B′‖− k+(k+1)ℓ is an integer, we have T ≤ 0. If T = 0 then ℓ= 0 and ‖B′‖= k. Now
assume T < 0. If ℓ = 0, B′ is a hitting set with ‖B′‖ < k, and if ℓ > 0 then (k+ 1)ℓ > k, which
contradicts T = ‖B′‖− k+(k+ 1)ℓ < 0. In each possible case, we have a hitting set (as ℓ = 0) of
size at most k. This completes the proof of Lemma 3.11. ❑
Now we are ready to handle the eight remaining cases of candidate control.
Theorem 3.12 Bucklin voting is resistant to constructive and destructive control by partition of
candidates and by run-off partition of candidates (for each in both tie-handling models, TE and TP).
Proof. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.2, so it remains to show NP-hardness. For the construc-
tive cases, map the given RESTRICTED HITTING SET instance (B,S ,k) to the election (C,V ) from
Construction 3.10 with w being the distinguished candidate.
We claim that S has a hitting set of size at most k if and only if w can be made the unique
BV winner by exerting control via any of our four control scenarios (partition of candidates with or
without run-off, and for each in either tie-handling model, TE and TP).
From left to right: Suppose S has a hitting set B′ ⊆ B of size k. Partition the set of candidates
into the two subsets C1 = B′∪{c,d,w} and C2 =C−C1. According to Lemma 3.11, w is the unique
level 2 BV winner of subelection (C1,V ) = (B′∪{c,d,w},V ). No matter whether we have a run-off
or not, and regardless of the tie-handling rule used, the opponents of w in the final stage (if there are
any opponents at all) each are candidates from B. Since n > m, w has a majority in the final stage
on the first level with a score of 4n(k + 1)+ 9. Thus, w is the unique BV winner of the resulting
election.
From right to left: Suppose w can be made the unique BV winner via any of our four control
scenarios. Since c is not a BV winner of the election, there is a subset D⊆ B∪{d,w} of candidates
such that c is not a unique BV winner of election (D∪{c},V ). By Lemma 3.11, there exists a hitting
set for S of size at most k.
For the four destructive cases, we simply change the roles of c and w in the above argument. ❑
Again, since Bucklin voting is a special case of fallback voting, we have the following corollary.
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Corollary 3.13 Fallback voting is resistant to constructive and destructive control by partition of
candidates and by run-off partition of candidates (for each in both tie-handling models, TE and TP).
3.4 Voter Control
Turning now to voter control for Bucklin voting and fallback voting, we start with control by adding
and deleting voters, where we have both (classical) resistance and parameterized resistance results.
As in the previous section, recall that “parameterized resistance” (the R∗ entries in Table 1) refers to
W[2]-hardness of the corresponding control problem with respect to a specified parameter, and that
“resistance” (the R entries in Table 1) refers to NP-hardness of the corresponding control problem.
Again, recall from Section 2.5 that in the reductions to be presented in this section, the elections
constructed will always contain a subset B of candidates, where each candidate bi corresponds to the
element bi from the set B given in the (parameterized) decision problem the reduction starts from,
and it will always be clear from the context whether bi is meant to be a candidate or an element.
3.4.1 Control by Adding Voters
Theorem 3.14 Bucklin voting is resistant to constructive control by adding voters, and is para-
meterized-resistant when this control problem is parameterized by the number of voters added.
Proof. Again, in light of Remark 2.5 it is enough to give one reduction that proves both claims at
the same time. Let (G,k) with G = (B,E) be a given instance of k-DOMINATING SET as described
above. Define the election (C,V ∪U), where C = {c,w}∪B∪X ∪Y is the set of candidates, w is the
distinguished candidate, and X and Y are sets of padding candidates (recall Footnote 13 on page 21).
Padding candidates in X: X is a set of ∑ni=1 ‖N[bi]‖ candidates such that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we
can find a subset Xi ⊆ X with ‖N[bi]‖ elements such that Xi∩X j = /0 for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
with i 6= j. These subsets ensure that w is always placed at the (n+1)st position in the votes
of the unregistered voters in U below.
Padding candidates in Y: Y is a set of n padding candidates ensuring that none of the candidates
in B is ranked among the first n candidates in the votes of the registered voters in V below.
V is the collection of registered and U is the collection of unregistered voters. V ∪U consists of
the following n+ k−1 voters:
Voter list For each . . . number of voters ranking of candidates
V k−1 c Y B w X
U i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} 1 (B−N[bi]) Xi w c (N[bi]∪ (X −Xi)∪Y )
Clearly, c is the unique level 1 Bucklin winner of election (C,V ).
We claim that G has a dominating set of size k if and only if w can be made the unique Bucklin
winner by adding at most k voters from U .
From left to right: Suppose G has a dominating set B′ of size k. Add the corresponding voters
from U to the election (i.e., each voter ui for which bi ∈ B′). Now we have an election with 2k−1
voters, so the strict majority threshold is k.
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Since B′ is a dominating set, we have B = N[B′], so for each b j ∈ B there is at least one of the
added voters ui such that b j ∈N[bi], which means that b j is ranked to the right of w in these k added
votes. It follows that up to level n+1 only candidate w will reach this threshold of k, hence w is the
unique Bucklin winner of this election.
From right to left: Suppose w can be made the unique Bucklin winner by adding at most k
voters from U . Denote the set of these voters by U ′ and note that ‖U ′‖ ≤ k. Note further that
score1(C,V∪U ′)(c) = score
1
(C,V )(c) = k−1, that is, c reaches a score of k−1 already on the first level
(with or without adding U ′). However, if any candidate has a strict majority already on the first
level, then he or she is the unique Bucklin winner of the election. As w is the unique Bucklin
winner of (C,V ∪U ′), the strict majority threshold for V ∪U ′ must be greater than k− 1. This, in
turn, implies ‖U ′‖≥ k, so ‖U ′‖= k and the strict majority threshold for V ∪U ′ is exactly k. Note that
scoren+1(C,V∪U ′)(w) = k > k−1 = score
n+1
(C,V∪U ′)(x) and score
n
(C,V∪U ′)(w) = 0. Moreover, since adding
the voters from U ′ to the election has made w the unique Bucklin winner of (C,V ∪U ′), none of
the candidates in B can be ranked among the first n candidates by each voter in U ′; otherwise (i.e.,
if some candidate b j ∈ B would be ranked among the first n candidates by each voter in U ′), we
would have scoren(C,V∪U ′)(b j) = k, i.e., b j would reach a strict majority in (C,V ∪U ′) earlier than w,
a contradiction. But this means that the voters in U ′ correspond to a dominating set of size k in G.
Note that this polynomial-time reduction is parameterized, as the given parameter k of k-
DOMINATING SET is the same parameter k that bounds the number of voters allowed to be added
in this control problem. ❑
Corollary 3.15 Fallback voting is resistant to constructive control by adding voters, and is para-
meterized-resistant when this control problem is parameterized by the number of voters added.
In contrast to Corollary 3.15, fallback voting is vulnerable to destructive control by adding voters
and, as we will see later in Theorem 3.20, it is also vulnerable to destructive control by deleting
voters. In fact, the proof of Theorem 3.16 shows something slightly stronger: Fallback voting is
what Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR07] call “certifiably vulnerable” to this type
of destructive voter control, i.e., the algorithm showing vulnerability to destructive control by adding
voters not only decides whether or not control is possible but it even computes a successful control
action if one exists. Note that in the proof of Theorem 3.16, after giving a high-level description of
the algorithm, we present the algorithm in detail and argue for its correctness in parallel. Therefore,
we refrain from giving a formal presentation (e.g., in pseudocode, which would be overly difficult to
read). Note further that the algorithm is not designed so as to optimizing its runtime (as then it might
be harder to see it is correct); rather, we focus on clarity regarding the arguments for correctness.
Thus, we give an upper bound for the runtime (with respect to the number of candidates in the given
election) that still might be improved.
Theorem 3.16 Fallback voting is vulnerable to destructive control by adding voters, via an algo-
rithm whose worst-case runtime is in O(m2(n′+ p(n+n′))), where m is the number of candidates,
n, respectively n′, is the number of votes in V , respectively V ′, and p(x) is a polynomial giving an
upper bound for the time needed to compute level scores in an election with x voters.
Proof. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.3. We present a polynomial-time algorithm for solving
the destructive control by adding voters case. We will make use of the following notation. Given
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an election (C,V ), recall that maj(V ) = ⌊‖V‖/2⌋+1 denotes the strict majority threshold for V , and
define the deficit of candidate d ∈C for reaching a strict majority in (C,V ) on level i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ‖C‖,
by
def i(C,V )(d) = maj(V )− scorei(C,V )(d).
The input to our algorithm is an election (C,V ∪V ′) (where C is the set of candidates, V is
the collection of registered voters, and V ′ is the collection of unregistered voters), a distinguished
candidate c ∈C, and an integer ℓ (the number of voters allowed to be added). The algorithm either
outputs a sublist V ′′ ⊆ V ′, ‖V ′′‖ ≤ ℓ, that describes a successful control action (if any exists), or
indicates that control is impossible for this input.
We give a high-level description of the algorithm. We assume that c is initially the unique FV
winner of election (C,V ); otherwise, the algorithm simply outputs V ′′ = /0 and halts, since there is
no need to add any voters from V ′.
Let k be the largest number of candidates any voter in V ∪V ′ approves of. Clearly, k ≤ ‖C‖. The
algorithm proceeds in at most k+ 1 stages, where the last stage is the approval stage and checks
whether c can be dethroned as a unique FV winner by approval score via adding at most ℓ voters
from V ′, and all preceding stages are majority stages that check whether a candidate d 6= c can tie
or beat c on level i via adding at most ℓ voters from V ′. Since the first majority stage is slightly
different from the subsequent majority stages, we describe both cases separately.
Majority Stage 1: For each candidate d ∈C−{c}, check whether d can tie or beat c on the first
level via adding at most ℓ voters from V ′. To this end, find a list V ′d ⊆V ′ of largest cardinality such
that ‖V ′d‖ ≤ ℓ and all voters in V ′d approve of d on the first level. Check whether
score1(C,V∪V ′d)
(d) ≥ score1(C,V∪V ′d)(c).(3.1)
If (3.1) fails to hold, this d is hopeless, so go to the next candidate (or to the next stage if all other
candidates have already been checked in this stage). If (3.1) holds, check whether d has a strict
majority in (C,V ∪V ′d) on the first level, and if so, output V ′′ = V ′d and halt. Otherwise, this d is
hopeless, so go to the next candidate (or stage).
Majority Stage i, 1 < i ≤ k: This stage is entered only if it was not possible to find a successful
control action in majority stages 1, . . . , i−1. For each candidate d ∈C−{c}, check whether d can
tie with or beat c up to the ith level via adding at most ℓ voters from V ′. To this end, find a list
V ′d ⊆V ′ of largest cardinality such that ‖V ′d‖ ≤ ℓ and all voters in V ′d approve of d up to the ith level
but disapprove of c up to the ith level. Check whether
scorei(C,V∪V ′d)
(d) ≥ scorei(C,V∪V ′d)(c).(3.2)
If (3.2) fails to hold, this d is hopeless, so go to the next candidate (or to the next stage if all other
candidates have already been checked in this stage). If (3.2) holds, check whether d has a strict
majority in (C,V ∪V ′d) on the ith level, and if so, check whether
scorei−1(C,V∪V ′d)
(c) ≥ maj(V ∪V ′d).(3.3)
If (3.3) fails to hold, output V ′′ = V ′d and halt. Otherwise (i.e., if (3.3) holds), though d might
dethrone c by adding V ′d on the ith level, it was not quick enough: c has already won earlier. In that
case, find a largest list V ′cd ⊆V ′ such that
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1. ‖V ′d ∪V ′cd‖ ≤ ℓ,
2. all voters in V ′cd approve of both c and d up to the ith level, and
3. the voters in V ′cd are chosen such that c is approved of as late as possible by them (i.e., at
levels with a largest possible number, where ties may be broken arbitrarily).
Now, check whether
scorei−1(C,V∪V ′d∪V ′cd)
(c) ≥ maj(V ∪V ′d ∪V ′cd).(3.4)
If (3.4) holds, then d is hopeless, so go to the next candidate (or to the next stage if all other
candidates have already been checked in this stage). Otherwise (i.e., if (3.4) fails to hold), check
whether ‖V ′cd‖ ≥ def i(C,V∪V ′d)(d). If so (note that d has now a strict majority on level i), output
V ′′ =V ′d ∪V ′cd and halt. Note that, by choice of V ′cd , (3.2) implies that
scorei(C,V∪V ′d∪V ′cd)
(d)≥ scorei(C,V∪V ′d∪V ′cd)(c).
Thus, in (C,V ∪V ′d ∪V ′cd), d ties with or beats c and has a strict majority on the ith level (and now,
we are sure that d was not too late). Otherwise (i.e., if ‖V ′cd‖ < def i(C,V∪V ′d)(d)), this d is hopeless,
so go to the next candidate (or stage).
Approval Stage: This stage is entered only if it was not possible to find a successful control action
in majority stages 1,2, . . . ,k.
First, check if
score(C,V )(c)<
⌊
‖V‖+ ℓ
2
⌋
+1.(3.5)
If (3.5) fails to hold, output “control impossible” and halt, since we have found no candidate in the
majority stages who could tie or beat c and would have a strict majority when adding at most ℓ
voters from V ′, so adding any choice of at most ℓ voters from V ′ would c still leave a strict majority.
If (3.5) holds, looping over all candidates d ∈ C−{c}, check whether there are score(C,V )(c)−
score(C,V )(d)≤ ℓ voters in V ′ who approve of d and disapprove of c. If this is not the case, move on
to the next candidate, since d could never catch up on c via adding at most ℓ voters from V ′. If it is
the case for some d ∈C−{c}, however, add this list of voters (call it V ′d) and check whether
score(C,V∪V ′d)(c) < maj(V ∪V
′
d).(3.6)
If (3.6) holds, output V ′′ =V ′d and halt. Otherwise (i.e., if (3.6) fails to hold), check whether
ℓ−‖V ′d‖ ≥ ‖V ′/0‖(3.7)
≥ 2
(
score(C,V∪V ′d)(c)−
‖V ∪V ′d‖
2
)
,
where V ′/0 consists of those voters in V ′ who disapprove of both candidates, c and d. If (3.7) does
not hold, move on to the next candidate, since after adding these voters c would still have a strict
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majority. Otherwise (i.e., if (3.7) holds), add exactly 2(score(C,V∪V ′d)(c)− ‖V∪V ′d‖/2) voters from V ′/0(denoted by V ′/0,+). Output V ′′ =V ′d ∪V ′/0,+ and halt.
If we have entered the approval stage (because we were not successful in any of the majority
stages), but couldn’t find any candidate here who was able to dethrone c by adding at most ℓ voters
from V ′, we output “control impossible” and halt.
The correctness of the algorithm follows from the remarks made above. Crucially, note that the
algorithm proceeds in the “safest way possible”: If there is any successful control action then our
algorithm finds some successful control action.
It is also easy to see that this algorithm runs in polynomial time. More specifically, the algorithm
proceeds in at most k+1 ≤ m+1 stages, where in each stage certain conditions are checked for up
to m−1 candidates. For checking the conditions we have to go through the list V ′ and compute level
scores over at most n+n′ voters, each a constant number of times. Thus, the algorithm’s worst-case
runtime is in O(m2(n′+ p(n+n′))). (Recall that we didn’t optimize it in terms of its runtime; rather,
we described it in a way to make it easier to check its correctness.) ❑
Since Bucklin voting is a special case of fallback voting, Bucklin voting inherits vulnerability
from fallback voting in this control scenario.
Corollary 3.17 Bucklin voting is vulnerable to destructive control by adding voters.
3.4.2 Control by Deleting Voters
Theorem 3.18 Bucklin voting is resistant to constructive control by deleting voters, and is para-
meterized-resistant when this control problem is parameterized by the number of voters deleted.
Proof. In light of Remark 2.5, we again give only one reduction that proves both claims at the
same time. To prove W[2]-hardness, we again provide a reduction from k-DOMINATING SET. Let
(G,k) with G = (B,E) be a given instance of this problem as described at the start of this section.
Define the election (C,V ), where C = {c,w} ∪ B ∪ X ∪Y ∪ Z is the set of candidates, w is the
distinguished candidate, and X , Y , and Z are sets of padding candidates (recall Footnote 13).
Padding candidates in X: X is a set of ∑ni=1 ‖B−N[bi]‖ candidates such that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
we can find a subset Xi ⊆ X with n−‖N[bi]‖ elements such that Xi ∩X j = /0 for all i, j ∈
{1, . . . ,n} with i 6= j. These subsets ensure that c is always placed among the top (n+ 1)
positions in the first voter group of V below.
Padding candidates in Y: Y is a set of ∑ni=1 ‖N[bi]‖ candidates such that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we
can find a subset Yi ⊆ Y with ‖N[bi]‖ elements such that Yi ∩Yj = /0 for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
with i 6= j. These subsets ensure that w is always placed at the (n+1)st position in the second
voter group of V below.
Padding candidates in Z: Z is a set of (k−1)(n+1) candidates such that for each j, 1≤ j ≤ k−1,
we can find a subset Z j ⊆ Z with n+1 elements such that Zi∩Z j = /0 for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,k−1}
with i 6= j. These subsets ensure that no other candidate besides c and the candidates in Z j
gain any points up to the (n+2)nd level in the third voter group of V below.
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V is the following collection of 2n+ k−1 voters:
# For each . . . number of votes ranking of candidates
1 i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} 1 N[bi] c Xi ((B−N[bi])∪ (X −Xi)∪Y ∪Z) w,
2 i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} 1 (B−N[bi]) Yi w (N[bi]∪X ∪ (Y −Yi)∪Z∪{c}),
3 j ∈ {1, . . . ,k−1} 1 c Z j (B∪X ∪Y ∪ (Z−Z j)) w,
The relevant scores in (C,V ) can be seen in Table 6 below.
c w b j ∈ B
score1 k−1 0 ≤ n
scoren+1 n+k−1 n n
Table 6: Level i scores in (C,V ) for i ∈ {1,n+ 1} and the candidates in B∪{c,w}.
It holds that n+ k− 1 > maj(V ) > n. Since candidate w reaches a strict majority only on the
last level but c does so no later than on the (n+1)st level, w is not a unique Bucklin winner of this
election.
We claim that G has a dominating set of size k if and only if w can be made the unique Bucklin
winner by deleting at most k voters.
From left to right: Suppose G has a dominating set B′ of size k. Delete the corresponding voters
from the first voter group (i.e., each voter vi for which bi ∈ B′). Let V ′ denote the resulting set of
voters and note that ‖V ′‖= 2n−1. Now, in election (C,V ′) we have on level n+1:
• scoren+1(C,V ′)(b j)≤ n−1 for each b j ∈ B (from the first and second voter groups; no b j can have
a score of n on level n+ 1, since B′ is a dominating set in G, so B = N[B′], and all voters vi
corresponding to members bi of B′ have been deleted),
• scoren+1(C,V ′)(c) = (n− k)+ (k−1) = n−1 (from the first and third voter groups),
• scoren+1(C,V ′)(xi) = 1 for each xi ∈ X (from the first voter group),
• scoren+1
(C,V ′)(yi) = 1 for each yi ∈ Y (from the second voter group),
• scoren+1(C,V ′)(zi) = 1 for each zi ∈ Z (from the third voter group), and
• scoren+1(C,V ′)(w) = n (from the second voter group).
That is, only candidate w reaches a strict majority on level n + 1 in (C,V ′), so w is the unique
Bucklin winner of this election.
From right to left: Suppose w can be made the unique Bucklin winner by deleting at most k
voters. Let V ′ be the set of remaining voters. Observe that deleting less than k voters would make
it impossible for candidate w to be the unique Bucklin winner of the election. Indeed, if less than
k voters are deleted from V , the strict majority threshold for the set V ′ of remaining voters would
exceed n. However, since w is ranked last place in all votes except the n votes from the second voter
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group, w would reach a strict majority no earlier than on the last level and thus would not be the
unique Bucklin winner of this election. Clearly, w has to win election (C,V ′) on level n+1. Since
scoren+1(C,V )(bi) = n = score
n+1
(C,V )(w) for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, by deleting these k votes from V each bi
has to lose at least one point on the first n+ 1 levels. Obviously, no voters from the second voter
group can be deleted, for otherwise candidate w would not reach the strict majority threshold on
level n+1. Similarly, deleting voters from the third voter group does not make any bi ∈ B lose any
points up to level n+1. So at least part of the deleted voters have to be from the first voter group, let
us say we delete k′ ≤ k. Since every candidate bi ∈ B has to lose at least one point up to level n+1,
the k′ deleted voters in V −V ′ correspond to a dominating set in G. If k′ < k, we can delete voters
arbitrarily from the first and/or third voter group until the total allowed number of k deleted voters
is reached (that is needed to ensure the right majority threshold in the new election).
Note that this polynomial-time reduction is parameterized, as the given parameter k of k-
DOMINATING SET is the same parameter k that bounds the number of voters that may be deleted in
this control problem. ❑
Corollary 3.19 Fallback voting is resistant to constructive control by deleting voters, and is para-
meterized-resistant when this control problem is parameterized by the number of voters deleted.
The following theorem is stated without proof, since the algorithm for destructive control by
adding voters presented in the proof of Theorem 3.16 can easily be adapted to the deleting-voters
case.
Theorem 3.20 Fallback voting is vulnerable to destructive control by adding voters.
Again, since Bucklin voting is a special case of fallback voting, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.21 Bucklin voting is vulnerable to destructive control by adding voters.
3.4.3 Control by Partition of Voters
Theorem 3.22 Bucklin voting is resistant to constructive control by partition of voters in both tie-
handling models, TE and TP.
Proof. Susceptibility holds by Lemma 3.3. To show NP-hardness we reduce X3C to our control
problems. Let (B,S ) be an X3C instance with B = {b1,b2, . . . ,b3m}, m > 1, and a collection
S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} of subsets Si ⊆ B with ‖Si‖ = 3 for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We define the election
(C,V ), where C = B∪ {c,w,x} ∪D∪E ∪F ∪G is the set of candidates, w is the distinguished
candidate, and D, E , F , and G are sets of padding candidates (recall Footnote 13).
Subsets B1, B2, . . . , Bn of B: These are n subsets of B (in general, not disjoint) that are defined
such that each candidate in B gains exactly n points in total up to level 3m from the first and
the second voter group of V below. With ℓ j = ‖{Si ∈ S | b j ∈ Si}‖ for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3m,
these subsets are formally defined by Bi = {b j ∈ B | i ≤ n− ℓ j} for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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Padding candidates in D: D is a set of 3nm candidates such that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we can find
a subset Di ⊆ D with 3m−‖Bi‖ elements such that Di∩D j = /0 for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} with
i 6= j. These subsets ensure that w is always placed at position 3m+ 1 in the second voter
group of V below.
Padding candidates in E: E is a set of (3m− 1)(m+ 1) candidates such that for each k, 1 ≤ k ≤
m+ 1, we can find a subset Ek ⊆ E with 3m− 1 elements such that Ei∩E j = /0 for all i, j ∈
{1, . . . ,m+1} with i 6= j. These subsets ensure that no other candidate besides c and x gains
more than one point up to the (3m+1)st level in the third voter group of V below.
Padding candidates in F: F is a set of (3m+ 1)(m− 1) candidates such that for each l, 1 ≤ l ≤
m− 1, we can find a subset Fl ⊆ F with 3m+ 1 elements such that Fi ∩Fj = /0 for all i, j ∈
{1, . . . ,m− 1} with i 6= j. These subsets ensure that c does not gain any points up to level
3m+1 in the fourth voter group of V below.
Padding candidates in G: G is a set of n(3m− 3) candidates such that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we
can find a subset Gi ⊆ G with 3m− 3 elements such that Gi∩G j = /0 for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
with i 6= j. These subsets ensure that no other candidate besides c and those in Si gains more
than one point up to level 3m+1 in the first voter group of V below.
Let V consist of the following 2n+2m voters:
# For each . . . number of votes ranking of candidates
1 i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} 1 c Si Gi (G−Gi) F D E (B−Si) w x
2 i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} 1 Bi Di w G E (D−Di) F (B−Bi) c x
3 k ∈ {1, . . . ,m+1} 1 x c Ek F (E −Ek) G D B w
4 l ∈ {1, . . . ,m−1} 1 Fl c (F −Fl) G D E B w x
The strict majority threshold is reached with n+m+ 1 points and Table 7 shows the scores on
the relevant levels in election (C,V ).
c b j w x
score1 n ≤ n 0 m+1
score2 n+m+1 ≤ n 0 m+1
score3m n+m+1 n 0 m+1
score3m+1 n+m+1 n n m+1
Table 7: Level i scores in (C,V ) for i ∈ {1,2,3m,3m+ 1} and the candidates in B∪{c,w,x}.
Clearly, candidate c is the unique level 2 BV winner in (C,V ) with a level 2 score of n+m+1.
We claim that S has an exact cover S ′ for B if and only if w can be made the unique BV
winner of the resulting election by partition of voters (regardless of the tie-handling model used).
From left to right: Suppose S has an exact cover S ′ for B. Partition V as follows. Let V1
consist of:
• the m voters of the first group that correspond to the exact cover (i.e., those m voters of the
form c Si Gi (G−Gi) F D E (B−Si) w x for which Si ∈S ′) and
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• the m + 1 voters of the third group (i.e., all voters of the form
x c Ek F (E −Ek) G D B w).
Let V2 =V −V1. Table 8 shows the relevant scores in the two subelections.
(C,V1) (C,V2)
c b j x c b j w
score1 m 0 m+1 n−m ≤ n−1 0
score2 2m+1 ≤ 1 m+1 n−m ≤ n−1 0
score3m 2m+1 1 m+1 n−m n−1 0
score3m+1 2m+1 1 m+1 n−m n−1 n
Table 8: Level i scores in (C,V1) and (C,V2) for i ∈ {1,2,3m,3m+ 1} and the candidates in B∪{c,w,x}.
In subelection (C,V1), candidate x is the unique level 1 BV winner. In subelection (C,V2),
candidate w is the first candidate who has a strict majority and moves on to the final round of the
election. Thus there are w and x in the final run-off, which w wins with a strict majority on the first
level as can be seen in Table 9 presenting the scores of x and w in the final election.
x w
score1 m+1 2n+m−1
score2 2n+2m 2n+2m
Table 9: Level i scores of w and x in the final election ({w,x},V ) for i ∈ {1,2}.
Since both subelections, (C,V1) and (C,V2), have unique BV winners, candidate w can be made
the unique BV winner by partition of voters, regardless of the tie-handling model used.
From right to left: Suppose that w can be made the unique BV winner by exerting control by
partition of voters (for concreteness, say in TP). Let (V1,V2) be such a successful partition. Since
w wins the resulting two-stage election, w has to win at least one of the subelections (say, w wins
(C,V2)). If candidate c participates in the final round, he or she wins the election with a strict
majority no later than on the second level, no matter which other candidates move forward to the
final election. That means that in both subelections, (C,V1) and (C,V2), c must not be a BV winner.
Only in the second voter group candidate w (who has to be a BV winner in (C,V2)) gets points
earlier than on the second-to-last level. So w has to be a level 3m+1 BV winner in (C,V2) via votes
from the second voter group in V2. As c scores already on the first two levels in voter groups 1
and 3, only x and the candidates in B can prevent c from winning in (C,V1). However, since voters
from the second voter group have to be in V2 (as stated above), in subelection (C,V1) only candidate
x can prevent c from moving forward to the final round. Since x is always placed behind c in all
votes except those votes from the third voter group, x has to be a level 1 BV winner in (C,V1). In
(C,V2) candidate w gains all the points on exactly the (3m+1)st level, whereas the other candidates
scoring more than one point up to this level receive their points on either earlier or later levels, so
no candidate can tie with w on the (3m+ 1)st level and w is the unique level 3m+ 1 BV winner
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in (C,V2). As both subelections, (C,V1) and (C,V2), have unique BV winners other than c, the
construction works in model TE as well.
It remains to show that S has an exact cover S ′ for B. Since w has to win (C,V2) with the
votes from the second voter group, not all voters from the first voter group can be in V2 (otherwise
c would have n points already on the first level). On the other hand, there can be at most m voters
from the first voter group in V1 because otherwise x would not be a level 1 BV winner in (C,V1).
To ensure that no candidate contained in B has the same score as w, namely n points, and gets these
points on an earlier level than w in (C,V2), there have to be exactly m voters from the first group in
V1 and these voters correspond to an exact cover for B. ❑
Since Bucklin voting is a special case of fallback voting, fallback voting inherits the NP-
hardness lower bounds from Bucklin voting stated in Theorem 3.22.
Corollary 3.23 Fallback voting is resistant to constructive control by partition of voters in model
TE and model TP.
We now turn to destructive control by partition of voters in model TE where we show resistance
for Bucklin and fallback voting via a reduction from the dominating set problem that has been
defined in Section 2.5. The following construction will be used in the proof of Theorem 3.26.
Construction 3.24 Let ((B,A),k) be a given instance of DOMINATING SET with B =
{b1,b2, . . . ,bn} and n ≥ 1. Define the election (C,V ) with candidate set
C = B∪D∪E∪F ∪G∪{c,u,v,w,x,y},
where c is the distinguished candidate, D, E, F, G, and {u,v} are sets of padding candidates (recall
Footnote 13), and y is a “partition-enforcing” candidate (see below).
Padding candidates in D: D is a set of (k−1)(n+4) candidates such that for each j, 1≤ j≤ k−1,
we can find a subset D j ⊆D with n+4 elements such that Di∩D j = /0 for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,k−
1} with i 6= j. These subsets ensure that no other candidate besides x gains more than one
point up to level n+5 in the third voter group of V below.
Padding candidates in E: E is a set of 2(k + n) candidates such that for each l, 1 ≤ l ≤ m+ 1,
we can find a subset El ⊆ E with two elements and it holds that Ei ∩E j = /0 for all i, j ∈
{1, . . . ,k+ n} with i 6= j. These subsets ensure that x and y do not gain any points up to the
fourth level in the fourth voter group of V below.
Padding candidates in F: F is a set of 3n candidates such that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we can find
a subset Fi ⊆ F with three elements such that Fi ∩Fj = /0 for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} with i 6= j.
These subsets ensure that the candidates in B do not gain any points up to the fourth level in
the first voter group of V below.
Padding candidates in G: G is a set of n2 candidates such that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we can find a
subset Gi ⊆ G with ‖N[bi]‖ elements such that Gi∩G j = /0 for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} with i 6= j.
These subsets ensure that w does not gain any points up to level n+5 in the first voter group
of V below.
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Padding candidates u and v: These two candidates ensure that the other padding candidates are
not among the top n+5 positions in the second voter group of V below.
Partition-enforcing candidate y: This candidate ensures that the voter from the second voter
group of V below has to be in the subelection candidate w wins to finally beat c in the fi-
nal election.
V consists of the following 2k+2n votes that can be arranged in four groups:
# For each . . . number of votes ranking of candidates
1 i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} 1 Fi (B−N[bi]) Hi y w · · ·
· · · (N[bi]∪D∪E∪ (F −Fi)∪ (H−Hi)) u v c x
2 1 x w c B u v (D∪E∪F ∪H) y
3 j ∈ {1, . . . ,k−1} 1 x D j (B∪ (D−D j)∪E ∪F ∪H) u v y w c
4 l ∈ {1, . . . ,k+n} 1 c El x y (B∪D∪ (E−El)∪F ∪H) u v w
Table 10 shows the scores of c, w, and x on the first three levels. None of the other candidates scores
more than one point up to the third level. Note that c reaches a strict majority on this level and thus
is the unique level 3 BV winner in this election.
c w x
score1 k+n 0 k
score2 k+n 1 k
score3 k+n+1 1 k
Table 10: Level i scores of c, w, and x in (C,V ) for i ∈ {1,2,3}.
Lemma 3.25 In the election (C,V ) from Construction 3.24, for every partition of V into V1 and V2,
candidate c is the unique BV winner of at least one of the subelections, (C,V1) and (C,V2).
Proof. For a contradiction, we assume that in both subelections, (C,V1) and (C,V2), candidate c
is not a unique BV winner. Table 10 shows that half of the voters in V place c already on the first
level. So the following must hold:
• Both ‖Vi‖ must be even numbers for i ∈ {1,2} and
• score1(C,Vi)(c) =
‖Vi‖/2 for i ∈ {1,2}.
Because of the voter in the second voter group, candidate c will get a strict majority on the third
level in one of the subelections, let us say in (C,V1). So there has to be a candidate beating or tieing
with candidate c on the second or third level in (C,V1). The candidates in B, D, E , F , and H and the
candidates u, v, w, and y do not score more than one point up to the third level. Thus only candidate
x can possibly beat or tie with c on the second or third level in (C,V1). However, since x does not
score more than k points in total until the fourth level, c is the unique level 3 BV winner in (C,V1),
a contradiction. It follows that c is a unique BV winner of at least one of the subelections. ❑
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Theorem 3.26 Bucklin voting is resistant to destructive control by partition of voters in model TE,
and is parameterized-resistant when this control problem is parameterized by the size of the smaller
partition.
Proof. Susceptibility follows from Lemma 3.3. To prove NP-hardness, we again provide a re-
duction from the NP-complete problem DOMINATING SET that has been defined in Section 2.5.
Given a DOMINATING SET instance ((B,A),k), construct a Bucklin election (C,V ) according to
Construction 3.24.
We claim that G = (B,A) has a dominating set B′ of size k if and only if candidate c can be
prevented from being a unique BV winner by partition of voters in model TE.
From left to right: Let B′ be a dominating set for G of size k. Partition V into V1 and V2 as
follows. Let V1 consist of the following 2k voters:
• The voters of the first voter group corresponding to the dominating set, i.e., the k voters of the
form:
Fi (B−N[bi]) Hi y w (N[bi]∪D∪E∪ (F −Fi)∪ (H−Hi)) u v c x
for those i for which bi ∈ B′,
• the one voter from the second group:
x w c B u v (D∪E ∪F ∪H) y,
and
• the entire third voter group, i.e., the k−1 voters of the form:
x D j (B∪ (D−D j)∪E ∪F ∪H∪) u v y w c,
where 1 ≤ j ≤ k−1.
Let V2 =V −V1. Note that the strict majority threshold in V1 is maj(V1) = k+ 1. Again, since
the candidates in D, E , F , and H do not score more than one point up to level n+5, their level n+5
scores are not shown in Table 11. The level n+ 5 scores of the remaining candidates are shown
in this table. Note that w reaches a strict majority of k+ 1 on this level (and no other candidate
reaches a strict majority on this or an earlier level). Hence, w is the unique level n+5 BV winner in
subelection (C,V1) and thus participates in the final round.
c w x y bi ∈ B
scoren+5 1 k+1 k k ≤ k
Table 11: Level n+ 5 scores in (C,V1).
From Lemma 3.25 it follows that candidate c is the unique winner in subelection (C,V2). So the
final-stage election is ({c,w},V ) and we have the following scores on the first two levels:
score1({c,w},V )(c) = score
1
({c,w},V )(w) = k+n,
score2({c,w},V )(c) = score
2
({c,w},V )(w) = 2k+2n.
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Since none of c and w have a strict majority on the first level, both candidates are level 2 BV
winners in this two-candidate final-stage election. Hence, c has been prevented from being a unique
BV winner by partition of voters in model TE.
From right to left: Assume that c can be prevented from being a unique BV winner by partition
of voters in model TE. From Lemma 3.25 we know that candidate c must participate in the final-
stage election. Since we are in model TE, at most two candidates participate in the final run-off. To
prevent c from being a unique BV winner of the final election, there must be another finalist and
this other candidate has to beat or tie with c. Since w is the only candidate that can beat or tie with c
in a two-candidate election, w has to move on to the final round to run against c. Let us say that c is
the unique winner of subelection (C,V2) and w is the unique winner of subelection (C,V1). For w to
be the unique winner of subelection (C,V1), V1 has to contain voters from the first voter group and
w can win only on the (n+5)th level. In particular, x is placed before w in all voter groups except
the first, so w can win in (C,V1) only via voters from the first voter group participating in (C,V1).
Moreover, since w is placed in the last or second-to-last position in all voters from the third and
fourth groups, and since there is only one voter in the second group, w can win only on the (n+5)th
level (which is w’s position in the votes from the first voter group).
Let I ⊆ {1, . . . ,n} be the set of indices i such that first-group voter
Fi (B−N[bi]) Hi y w (N[bi]∪D∪E∪ (F −Fi)∪ (H−Hi)) u v c x
belongs to V1. Let ℓ = ‖I‖. Since w is the unique level n+ 5 BV winner of (C,V1) but y is placed
before w in every vote in the first group, the one voter from the second group (which is the only
voter who prefers w to y) must belong to V1. Thus we know that
scoren+5(C,V1)(w) = ℓ+1 and score
n+4
(C,V1)(y) = score
n+5
(C,V1)(y) = ℓ.
For the candidates in B, we have
scoren+4(C,V1)(b j) = score
n+5
(C,V1)(b j) = 1+‖{bi | i ∈ I and b j 6∈ N[bi]}‖,
since each b j scores one point up to the (n+4)th level from the voter in the second group and one
point from the first group for every bi with i ∈ I such that b j 6∈ N[bi] in graph G. Again, since w is
the unique level n+5 BV winner of (C,V1), no b j ∈ B can score a point in each of the ℓ votes from
the first voter group that belong to V2. This implies that for each b j ∈ B there has to be at least one
bi with i ∈ I that is adjacent to b j in G. Thus, the set B′ of candidates bi with i ∈ I corresponds to a
dominating set in G.
Recall that scoren+5(C,V1)(w) = ℓ+ 1 and score
n+4
(C,V1)(y) = ℓ. Note also that score
n+4
(C,V1)(b j) ≤ ℓ
for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Since w needs a strict majority to be a BV winner in (C,V1), it must hold that
maj(V1) ≤ ℓ+ 1. Since y and the b j ∈ B have a score of ℓ already one level earlier than w, it must
hold that maj(V1) = ℓ+ 1, which implies ‖V2‖ = 2ℓ or ‖V2‖ = 2ℓ+ 1. To ensure this cardinality
of V1, other votes have to be added. Since y must not gain additional points from these votes up to
the (n+ 5)th level, they cannot come from the fourth voter group. The remaining votes from the
third voter group total up to k−1. Thus, since w is the unique BV winner in subelection (C,V1), it
must hold that ℓ ≤ k. So ‖B′‖ = ℓ ≤ k and this means that there exists a dominating set of size at
most k.
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Observe that reducing from the W[2]-complete parameterized problem k-DOMINATING SET
with the same construction and the new parameter k′ = 2k (the size of the smaller partition), we can
prove that destructive control by partition of voters in model TE in Bucklin voting is W[2]-hard. ❑
Resistance (and parameterized resistance) for fallback voting to this control type now follows
immediately.
Corollary 3.27 Fallback voting is resistant to destructive control by partition of voters in model TE,
and is parameterized-resistant when this control problem is parameterized by the size of the smaller
partition.
The following construction will be used to handle the case of destructive control by partition of
voters in model TP (see Theorem 3.30 below) for fallback voting. Construction 3.28 starts from an
instance of the NP-complete problem RESTRICTED HITTING SET defined in Section 2.5.
Construction 3.28 Let (B,S ,k) be a given instance of RESTRICTED HITTING SET, where B =
{b1,b2, . . . ,bm} is a set, S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn} is a collection of nonempty subsets Si ⊆ B such that
n > m, and k is an integer with 1 < k < m.
Define the election (C,V ), where
C = B∪D∪E∪{c,w}
is the candidate set with D = {d1, . . . ,d2(m+1)} and E = {e1, . . . ,e2(m−1)}. Note that the candidates
contained in D and E are padding candidates (recall Footnote 13). In particular, the candidates in
D ensure that w is always placed at the third position in the votes of the fourth voter group of V
below. The collection of voters V consists of the following 2n(k+1)+4m+2mk voters:
# For each . . . number of voters ranking of approved candidates
1 i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} k+1 w Si c
2 j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} 1 c b j w
3 j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} k−1 b j
4 p ∈ {1, . . . ,m+1} 1 d2(p−1)+1 d2p w
5 r ∈ {1, . . . ,2(m−1)} 1 er
6 n(k+1)+m− k+1 c
7 mk+ k−1 c w
8 1 w c
The strict majority threshold for V is maj(V ) = n(k+1)+2m+mk+1. In election (C,V ), only
the two candidates c and w reach a strict majority, w on the third level and c on the second level (see
Table 12). Thus c is the unique level 2 FV winner of election (C,V ).
Lemma 3.29 will be used in the proof of Theorem 3.30.
Lemma 3.29 In the election (C,V ) from Construction 3.28, for every partition of V into V1 and V2,
candidate c is an FV winner of (C,V1) or (C,V2).
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c w b j ∈ B dp ∈ D er ∈ E
score1 n(k+ 1)+ 2m+mk n(k+ 1)+ 1 k− 1 ≤ 1 1
score2 n(k+ 1)+ 2m+mk+ 1 n(k+ 1)+mk+ k ≤ k+ n(k+ 1) 1 1
score3 ≤ 2n(k+ 1)+ 2m+mk+1 n(k+ 1)+ 2m+mk+ k+1 ≤ k+ n(k+ 1) 1 1
scorem+2 2n(k+ 1)+ 2m+mk+1 n(k+ 1)+ 2m+mk+ k+1 ≤ k+ n(k+ 1) 1 1
Table 12: Level i scores for i ∈ {1,2,m+ 2} in the election (C,V ) from Construction 3.28.
Proof. For a contradiction, suppose that in both subelections, (C,V1) and (C,V2), candidate c is
not an FV winner. Since score1(C,V )(c) = ‖V‖/2, the two subelections must satisfy that
• both ‖V1‖ and ‖V2‖ are even numbers, and
• score1(C,V1)(c) =
‖V1‖/2 and score1(C,V2)(c) = ‖V2‖/2.
Otherwise, c would have a strict majority already on the first level in one of the subelections and
would win that subelection. For each i ∈ {1,2}, c already on the first level has only one point less
than the strict majority threshold maj(Vi) in subelection (C,Vi), and c will get a strict majority in
(C,Vi) no later than on the (m+2)nd level. Thus, for both i = 1 and i = 2, there must be candidates
whose level m+ 2 scores in (C,Vi) are higher than the level m+ 2 score of c in (C,Vi). Table 12
shows the level m+2 scores of all candidates in (C,V ). Only w and some b j ∈ B have a chance to
beat c on that level in (C,Vi), i ∈ {1,2}.
Suppose that c is defeated in both subelections by two distinct candidates from B (say, bx defeats
c in (C,V1) and by defeats c in (C,V2)). Thus the following must hold:15
scorem+2(C,V1)(bx)+ score
m+2
(C,V2)(by) ≥ score
m+2
(C,V )(c)+2
2n(k+1)+2k−n(k+1) ≥ 2n(k+1)+mk+2m+3
2k ≥ n(k+1)+mk+2m+3,
which by our basic assumption m > k > 1 implies the following contradiction:
0 ≥ n(k+1)+ (m−2)k+2m+3 > n(k+1)+ (k−2)k+2k+3 = n(k+1)+ k2 +3 > 0.
Thus the only possibility for c to not win any of the two subelections is that c is defeated in one
subelection, say (C,V1), by a candidate from B, say bx, and in the other subelection, (C,V2), by
candidate w. Then it must hold that:15
scorem+2(C,V1)(bx)+ score
m+2
(C,V2)(w) ≥ score
m+2
(C,V )(c)+2
2n(k+1)+2k+2m+mk+1−n(k+1)−1 ≥ 2n(k+1)+mk+2m+3
2k ≥ n(k+1)+3.
Since n > 1, this cannot hold, so c must be an FV winner in one of the two subelections. ❑
15For the left-hand sides of the inequalities, note that each vote occurs in only one of the two subelections. To avoid
double-counting those votes that give points to both candidates, we first sum up the overall number of points each
candidate scores and then substract the double-counted points.
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Theorem 3.30 Fallback voting is resistant to destructive control by partition of voters in model TP.
Proof. Susceptibility holds by Corollary 3.4. To prove NP-hardness, we reduce RESTRICTED
HITTING SET to our control problem. Consider the election (C,V ) constructed according to Con-
struction 3.28 from a given RESTRICTED HITTING SET instance (B,S ,k), where B = {b1, . . . ,bm}
is a set, S = {S1, . . . ,Sn} is a collection of nonempty subsets Si ⊆ B, and k is an integer with
1 < k < m < n.
We claim that S has a hitting set B′ ⊆ B of size k if and only if c can be prevented from being
a unique FV winner by partition of voters in model TP.
From left to right: Suppose, B′ ⊆ B is a hitting set of size k for S . Partition V into V1 and V2 the
following way. Let V1 consist of those voters of the second group where b j ∈ B′ and of those voters
of the third group where b j ∈ B′. Let V2 =V −V1. In (C,V1), no candidate reaches a strict majority
(see Table 13), where maj(V1) = ⌊k2/2⌋+ 1, and candidates c, w, and each b j ∈ B′ win the election
with an approval score of k.
c w b j ∈ B′ b j 6∈ B′
score1 k 0 k−1 0
score2 k 0 k 0
score3 k k k 0
Table 13: Level i scores in (C,V1) for i ∈ {1,2,3} and the candidates in B∪{c,w}.
c w b j 6∈ B′ b j ∈ B′
score1 n(k+1)+2m− k+mk n(k+1)+1 k−1 0
score2 n(k+1)+2m− k+mk+1 n(k+1)+mk+ k ≤ k+n(k+1) ≤ n(k+1)
score3 ≥ n(k+1)+2m− k+mk+1 n(k+1)+mk+2m+1 ≤ k+n(k+1) ≤ n(k+1)
Table 14: Level i scores in (C,V2) for i ∈ {1,2,3} and the candidates in B∪{c,w}.
The level i scores in election (C,V2) for i ∈ {1,2,3} and the candidates in B∪{c,w} are shown
in Table 14. Since in (C,V2) no candidate from B wins, the candidates participating in the final
round are B′∪{c,w}. The scores in the final election (B′∪{c,w},V ) can be seen in Table 15. Since
candidates c and w with the same level 2 scores are both level 2 FV winners, candidate c has been
prevented from being a unique FV winner by partition of voters in model TP.
c w b j ∈ B′
score1 n(k+1)+2m+mk n(k+1)+m+2 k−1
score2 n(k+1)+2m+mk+1 n(k+1)+2m+mk+1 ≤ k+n(k+1)
Table 15: Level i scores in the final-stage election (B′∪{c,w},V ) for i ∈ {1,2}.
From right to left: Suppose candidate c can be prevented from being a unique FV winner by
partition of voters in model TP. From Lemma 3.29 it follows that candidate c participates in the
44
final round. Since c has a strict majority of approvals, c has to be tied with or lose against another
candidate by a strict majority at some level. Only candidate w has a strict majority of approvals, so
w has to tie or beat c at some level in the final round. Because of the low scores of the candidates
in D and E we may assume that only candidates from B are participating in the final round besides
c and w. Let B′ ⊆ B be the set of candidates who also participate in the final round. Let ℓ be the
number of sets in S not hit by B′. As w cannot reach a strict majority of approvals on the first level,
we consider the level 2 scores of c and w:
score2(B′∪{c,w},V )(c) = n(k+1)+2m+mk+1+ ℓ(k+1),
score2(B′∪{c,w},V )(w) = n(k+1)+2m+mk+ k−‖B
′‖+1.
Since c has a strict majority already on the second level, w must tie or beat c on this level, so the
following must hold:
score2(B′∪{c,w},V )(c)− score
2
(B′∪{c,w},V )(w) ≤ 0
n(k+1)+2m+mk+1+ ℓ(k+1)−n(k+1)−2m−mk− k+‖B′‖−1 ≤ 0
‖B′‖− k+ ℓ(k+1) ≤ 0.
This is possible only if ℓ= 0 (i.e., all sets in S are hit by B′), which implies ‖B′‖ ≤ k. Thus S has
a hitting set of size at most k. ❑
4 Conclusions and Open Questions
We have shown that, among natural election systems with a polynomial-time winner problem, fall-
back voting displays the broadest control resistance currently known to hold. We have also shown
that Bucklin voting behaves almost as good (possibly even as good) as fallback voting in terms of
control resistance. In particular, both voting systems are resistant to all standard types of candidate
control and to all standard types of constructive control. In total, fallback voting has 20 resistances
and two vulnerabilities and Bucklin voting possesses at least 19 (possibly even 20) resistances and
has at least two (and can have no more than three) vulnerabilities. One case remains open: destruc-
tive control by partition of voters in the tie-handling model “ties promote” for Bucklin voting. For
comparison, recall from Table 1 that approval voting is vulnerable to destructive control by partition
of voters both in model TE and in model TP and that SP-AV is vulnerable to this control type in
model TE but resistant in model TP.
With this paper the research program that was started by Bartholdi et al. [BTT92] two decades
ago may now be viewed as “essentially completed.”
We also strengthened some of our resistance (i.e., NP-hardness) results for (unparameterized)
control problems by showing that their parameterized variants for natural parameterizations are
even W[2]-hard. It remains open whether or not these problems belong to W[2]. Another interesting
task for future research along these lines is to find natural parameterizations for the other problems
(including some problems modeling control by partition of either candidates or voters) and to study
their parameterized complexity.
From a theoretical point of view, it would also be interesting and challenging to do a typical-case
analysis for control problems as has been done for manipulation (see, e.g., [CSL07, PR07, FKN08,
XC08a, XC08b] and the survey [RS12c]).
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